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ABSTRACT 
This thesis assesses the reasons for the continuous division of the two Koreas and 
proposes necessary policies for Korean unification. In modern times, Koreans have been 
unable to determine their own destiny. Many examples show that Korea’s circumstances 
have been influenced by other countries. Korea’s division and the North Korean nuclear 
standoff are not only Korean problems but also international issues. In these contexts, 
Korean unification requires not only domestic efforts but also international efforts. Also, 
for successful consensual and peaceful unification, domestic and international efforts 
should not be passive and reactive. They should be practical, proactive, and 
comprehensive.  
In other words, Korean unification has been difficult because there have not been 
sufficiently proactive domestic and international efforts. Internal and external efforts can 
be implemented in three fields: military containment and negotiation, political 
negotiations and economic and social engagement. These three approaches are the 
fundamental pillars on which to build successful unification.  
Proactive and synchronous implementation of the three policies is the pivotal 
point in order to deal with North Korea because each policy is important and can be 
implemented in different fields. Strong defense is critical to supporting other policy 
implementation. Political negotiations can deal with the peace treaty issue. Economically, 
an engagement policy should be maintained to open North Korea and provide 
humanitarian aid. 
Through the proactive implementation of those policies for Korean unification by 
the two Koreas and four powers, northeast Asia will be more stable and peaceful. 
Peaceful Korean unification will be an important first step on the road to a more peaceful 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Ironically, the most heavily militarized frontier in the world is the demilitarized 
zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula. The DMZ was established by the Korean War 
Armistice Agreement, signed on 27 July 1953.1 Even though the Cold War has been over 
since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Korean peninsula remains unstable and is 
often referred to as the last remnant of the Cold War. Korea is still divided into two 
countries and the Korean War is not officially over. Korean unification seems far more 
remote. This thesis seeks to answer two questions: Why has Korean unification not 
happened yet? What is necessary for Korean unification?   
The answer should be found in the history. Historically, Korea has been the focus 
of conflict because of its strategic location. Don Oberdorfer writes: “Geography dealt 
Korea a particularly difficult role. Located in a strategic but dangerous neighborhood 
between the greater powers of China, Japan, and Russia, Korea has suffered nine hundred 
invasions, great and small, in its two thousand years of recorded history. It has 
experienced five major periods of foreign occupation--by China, the Mongols, Japan, and 
after World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union.”2  The international setting 
has impacted tremendously on the national agendas of Korea. All important political and 
economic changes and their influence on the Korean peninsula cannot be explained by 
domestic factors only but must also include an international context. Most political and 
economic changes on the Korean peninsula grew out of intertwined international and 
domestic factors. The difficulty of Korean unification can be explained by the 
international context. This thesis will be concerned with how international settings 
exerted more influence than domestic considerations on the Korean division. The context 
in which such a discussion has to be put is the relationship between Korea and the great 
powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union.   
                                                 
1 Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty, 
1st ed. (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004.), 87. 
2 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2001.), 3.  
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Even though the two Koreas’ national ambition is Korean unification, policy 
toward Korean unification has not been implemented proactively by the two Koreas and 
the great powers. The four great powers surrounding the Korean peninsula officially 
support Korean unification, but they might prefer status quo on the Korean peninsula. 
This is regrettable action because the great powers have influenced the destiny of Korea. 
Thus, very proactive actions should be taken to achieve Korean unification. The proactive 
strategy should be implemented by the two Koreas and the four powers together. Any 
policy for Korean unification would not be effective without coordination between the 
two Koreas and the four powers.  
The roots of the Korean War and the current North Korean nuclear crisis show the 
reasons why Korean unification has not happened yet and why unification efforts should 
be achieved through Korean and international efforts. Also, the strategy for Korean 
unification should be a combination of three policies – military containment and 
negotiations, political negotiations, and economic and social engagement – and should be 
implemented together. Without the implementation of those three policies by the two 
Koreas and the four powers, Korean unification would be extremely difficult. The 
purpose of this thesis is to assess which factors are important for peaceful Korean 
unification and to provide policy options to make the unification process successful. 
B.  HYPOTHESIS  
International support is indispensable for Korean unification. Also, the 
prerequisites for consensual and peaceful Korean unification would be convergence of 
the militaries, politics and economies of the two Koreas and the four powers (China, 
Japan, Russia, and the United States). Their convergence is possible when the 
international context is favorable and essential conditions are met. That is, Korean 
unification efforts should be made proactively by internal and external military, political, 
and economic and social approaches.  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In order to explain why international support is necessary for Korean unification, 
Chapters II and III of the thesis analyze the impact of the international setting on the 
Korean peninsula. The best example of international influence on the Korean peninsula is 
the Korean War. Chapter II explains the roots of the Korean War in its internal and 
3 
external contexts. The North Korean nuclear crisis also shows the importance of 
international influence. Chapter III explores North Korea’s motivations to develop 
nuclear weapons in a context of internal and external change. These two examples 
demonstrate the necessity of understanding the international context to interpret any 
change on the Korean peninsula.  
Given these contexts, Chapter IV explains a proactive grand strategy for 
consensual and peaceful Korean unification that combines domestic and international 
efforts. Peaceful Korean unification will make all of northeast Asia peaceful and solve 
North Korean problems. The grand strategy has three important pillars − military 
containment and negotiations, political negotiations and economic and social engagement 
− for successful implementation. These approaches are explained in detail in Chapters V, 
VI, and VII. To be sure, each approach should be implemented internally and externally. 
Chapter V examines military containment and negotiations because any ambiguity or 
concern about military and security issues will impede successful policy. Robust defense 
is essential for implementation of the other two approaches and military-to-military 
negotiations should follow later. Chapter VI discusses political negotiations and offers a 
detailed implementation policy for a peace treaty on the Korean peninsula. Political 
negotiations should be initiated by the two Koreas and supported by the United States and 
China. Also, endorsement of the United Nations would be ideal. Chapter VII discusses 
possible and necessary economic and social engagement policies. The combination of 
these three approaches will help unify the two Koreas and continue to be beneficial after 
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II.  THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL SETTING ON THE 
KOREAN PENINSULA: THE KOREAN WAR  
North Korea launched its massive offensive against South Korea on 25 June 1950. 
However, it has not been clear to many scholars how and why the attack was made. The 
Korean War has been a very attractive subject to study because there seems to be no clear 
answer for the causes of the Korean War and solutions for a peaceful Korea. Some 
scholars even argue that South Korea struck first and North Korea’s invasion was a 
responsive action.3   
The ambiguity still exists on the Korean peninsula. Even though the Cold War has 
been over since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Korean Peninsula remains unstable and 
is referred to as the last evidence of the Cold War. When the 38th parallel was drawn and 
the Armistice Agreement was signed, they were only intended as temporary measures. 
However, the 38th parallel still divides the Korean peninsula into two separate states that 
are technically still at war. The Armistice Agreement still influences any aggressive 
action between the United States―along with South Korea―and North Korea, because 
no peace treaty has ever been signed and unification has not happened. The objective of 
this chapter is to describe and clarify the roots of the Korean War in order to understand 
how the Korean War occurred and to find the solutions for a peaceful Korean unification 
in the future. 
What were the main roots of the Korean War? The beginning of the Korean War 
cannot be tied to one specific cause. It was largely the result of competing Great Power 
interests intertwined with indigenous competition between South Korea and North Korea. 
This meant that the Korean War fed into and was impacted by both external and internal 
causes. Domestic movements seeking independence, sovereignty, and international support 
intertwined with American-Soviet competition occurring on the Korean peninsula. The 
Korean War emerged from nationalistic domestic actors struggling for political power, but 
eventually came to be understood as having broader international significance sufficient to 
engage the great powers in competition with each other. This thesis argues that the reason for 
                                                 
3 Karunakar Gupta, “How did the Korean War Begin?” The China Quarterly, No. 52, October-
December 1972, 699.  
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various explanations is that the Korean War did not break out because of one clear cause. 
The reasons for the Korean War had been forming through the period since the end of 
World War II. Consequently, the reasons for the war cannot be explained only by internal 
factors but must also include external factors.   
The first section surveys the preceding analysis and explains various perspectives on 
the Korean War such as the traditionalist or revisionist positions. It is necessary to know each 
approach to develop a coherent theoretical framework as a means of distilling each position 
and blending the wisdom of both positions. In the second and third sections, the roots of the 
Korean War will be divided into internal and external groups. Each explanation will produce 
the possible assumptions and reasons for its position, but one approach cannot explain all of 
the roots of the Korean War. The secret to understanding the roots of the Korean War is to 
combine those approaches. Based on those explanations, this thesis will conclude with the 
solutions for a consensual and peaceful Korean unification. Because the roots of the Korean 
War can be explained by both domestic and international factors, solutions for Korean 
unification must be not only Korean efforts, but also international cooperation and support.       
A. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO AND EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
KOREAN WAR 
There are two main approaches to explain the Korean War―traditionalist and 
revisionist. While the traditionalist approach has focused on Soviet expansionism, the 
revisionist approach has explained the Korean War as a civil war. However, neither the 
traditionalists nor the revisionists have an adequate framework for understanding the 
complex roots of the Korean War. 
1.  Traditionalist  
a.  Soviet Expansionism 
The traditional perspective considers the Korean War as a Soviet-inspired 
external war. President Truman and his advisors were typical traditionalists who assumed 
that North Korea was a puppet and the Soviet Union was the puppeteer. The United 
States intervened because it thought it was a Soviet attack. On 27 June 1950, the 
President announced his order to send U.S. troops to Korea and explained the reasons: 
In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to 
give the Korean Government troops cover and support. The attack upon 
Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed 
7 
beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now 
use armed invasion and war.4 
President Truman explained in his memoirs and speeches why he decided 
to deter the Soviet attack. Almost one year after, on 11 April 1951, President Truman 
broadcast a radio report to the American public on Korea and affirmed that the cause of 
the Korean War was the Soviet expansionism: 
I want to talk to you plainly tonight about what we are doing in Korea and 
about our policy in the Far East. In the simplest terms, what we are doing 
in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war….The 
Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to 
stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United 
States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear 
to everyone that the United States cannot—and will not—sit idly by and 
await foreign conquest. The only question is: What is the best time to meet 
the threat and how is the best way to meet it? The best time to meet the 
threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning 
when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze.5   
Interestingly, even Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that the Korean War must 
have been a Russian conspiracy to make the United States and China fight each other. He 
said, “In any case, the opportunity to stimulate a head-on clash between America and 
China must have been welcomed by Stalin, and deservedly so.” 6   There are other 
traditionalists’ arguments, mainly from the 1960s. David Rees explains that the Korean 
War plan was made by the Soviet Union and June 1950 was best for North Korea to 
initiate the war:  
Lastly, the planning of the invasion. It was a Soviet war plan, reportedly 
worked out by the Russian General Antonov, and during the winter of 
1949-50, the remainder of the KVC crossed into Korea, Sino-Korean 
relations, long strained, were patched up, and large scale Russian 
deliveries of tanks, artillery, and heavy equipment were made to North 
                                                 
4 “Statement, dated June 27, 1950, by President Harry S. Truman, announcing his order to send U.S. 
air and naval forces to help defend South Korea and explaining the rationale for his decision. Papers of 
George M. Elsey,” 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/week1/kw_27_1.htm (accessed on 
15 August 2006). 
5 Harry S.Truman, “Radio Report to the American People on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Far 
East,” Truman Presidential Museum and Library, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=290 (accessed on 15 August 2006) 
6 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “How the Cold War was Played,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 1, October 
1972, pp.181-209.  
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Korea...With this well-trained and heavily-armed Soviet satellite army 
now fully ready for action, and with the current political confusion and 
strategic weaknesses of American Far Eastern policy, together with  
 
the political and economic chaos in the ROK, there could hardly have 
been a better moment to launch a North Korean invasion across the 38th 
parallel than in June 1950.7    
Cho Soon Sung said, “The truth appears to be that Russia initiated the 
conflict mainly because the United States had shown little interest in Korea, and 
accordingly Russia thought it could seize control of the South without risking total 
confrontation.”8  
b.  Counterargument 
Traditionalists maintain that Soviet expansionism and its foreign policy 
caused the Korean War, but that is not enough to explain the Korean War as a whole. 
There are two reasons for this idea’s inadequacy.  First, it cannot explain the absence of 
the Soviet Union in the Security Council meeting on 27 June 1950, right after the 
beginning of the Korean War. If the Soviet Union had initiated the Korean War, it surely 
would have vetoed UN involvement in the hostilities. The Soviet Union had insisted that 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) should occupy one of the permanent seats on the 
Security Council, instead of the Republic of China.9 The Security Council decided to 
have the UN become involved in the Korean War under the United States’ control. If the 
Soviet Union had been present, or the PRC had taken one of the Security Council seats, 
UN involvement in the Korean War would not have happened.10 The Soviet Union 
claimed that the UN involvement decision was illegal, in August, when it returned to the 
Security Council to assume the rotating presidency of that body.11  
Second, newly released documents from Russia show that North Korea 
was the main actor of the Korean War. Traditionalists did not explain the domestic 
                                                 
7 David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), 19-20.  
8 Cho, Soon Sung, Korea in World Politics 1940-1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 271.  
9 William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspective on International Law, 4th ed. (Balmont, CA: 
Thomson West, 2003), 125. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Robert Leckie, Conflict: The History of the Korean War, 1950-1953 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1962), 54. 
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struggle as part of causes of the Korean War. When traditionalists claimed that the Soviet 
expansionism was the root cause of the Korean War, Russian documents on the Korean 
War had not been released. After the end of the Cold War, previously classified 
documents became available to scholars. In 1994, 216 documents covering the period 
1949-1950 were released.12 Kathryn Weathersby has done extensive translation and holds 
a firm belief that the Korean War was initiated by North Korea.13 She says, “The North 
Korean attempt to reunify the country through a military campaign clearly represented a 
sharp departure from the basic Soviet policy toward Korea. The initiative for this 
departure came from Pyongyang, not Moscow.”14  
2. Revisionist  
The most important point of the revisionists is that they explain the origins of the 
Korean War as internal in nature. They consider the Korean War as a civil war. 
Revisionists are adept at showing flaws in the traditionalist vision by pointing out how 
domestic politics played an important role.  
a.  Civil Conflict  
(1)  “Trap” Theory - South Korea’s Provocation? Bruce 
Cumings is the most important revisionist. His theory is called the “Haeju seizure” 
theory.15 Also, his theory is known as the “trap” theory because “it is possible that the 
North was responding to a provocative attack from South Korea, as the DPRK has 
consistently maintained.” 16  Bruce Cumings argues that the conflict at Haeju, at the 
Ongjin peninsula, was the start of the Korean War and South Korea started first. He 
explains his rationale: 
What no one saw fit to point out is that the Ongjin peninsula is hardly the 
place to start an invasion if you are heading southward: it’s a cul-de-sac, 
and the 17th Regiment could simply have been blocked near Haeju if Kim 
                                                 
12 Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 357. 
13 Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New 
Evidence From Russian Archives,” Cold War International History Project, Working Paper, No. 8, 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, 1993), 31. 
14 Ibid. 
15 “Historian Debunks Claim that South Started Korean War,” The Chosun Ilbo,  23 June 2006, 
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200606/200606230014.html (accessed on 15 August 2006). 
16 Weathersby, 3. 
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Il Sung feared a southern counterattack after his invasion. It is a good 
place to jump off if you are heading northward, since it commands 
transportation leading right to Pyongyang, and in June 1950 was remote 
from the Seoul-based American attempts to rein in southern army 
commanders.17 
He argues that “the war began in the same, remote locus of much 
of the 1949 fighting, the Ongjin Peninsula, and some hours later spread along the parallel 
eastward, to Kaesong, Chunchon, and the East Coast.”18 According to Cumings, whether 
or not the question remains open as to who initiated the Korean War, Koreans were the 
main actors of the Korean War and each hoped to unify Korea under its control with the 
great powers’ support.19 He argues that Kim Il Sung acted independently and the Soviet 
influence was minimal.  
Cumings has developed the perspectives of two previous 
revisionists―I. F. Stone and Karunakar Gupta. I. F. Stone is the first scholar to claim that 
South Korea provoked North Korea. Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, publisher of 
I.T. Stone’s book The Hidden Story of the Korean War, agree with Stone and summarize 
their position about outbreak of the Korea War: 
In the view of the background, and all the surroundings circumstances, we 
have come to the conclusion that what probably happened is that Syngman 
Rhee deliberately provoked the North Koreans in the hope that they would 
retaliate by crossing the parallel in force. The northerners, for their part, 
fell neatly into the trap.20 
Karunakar Gupta, an Indian Scholar, boldly argues that the South 
Korean Army ignited the Korean War with an assault on Haeju, a North Korean city on 
the Ongjin peninsula.  His argument influenced Bruce Cumings’ revisionism. Karunakar 
Gupta claims the South Korean Army’s provocation attack in his article, “How did the 
Korean War Begin?” 
Certainly there is no denying the massive nature of the assault mounted by 
North Korea on the morning of 25 June 1950, even if it appears unlikely                                                  
17 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War (Princeton, N.J.:  University Press, 1990), 571-572. 
18 Ibid., 568.  
19 Steven Hugh Lee, The Korean War (London: Longman, 2001), 39.  
20 Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, “Publisher’s Foreword,” in I.F. Stone, The Hidden History of 
the Korean War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952), x.  
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that this was sanctioned by the Soviet Union. But what is missing from 
this line of analysis is any consideration of the degree to which South 
Korean provocation may have taken two forms: First, the immediate 
provocation represented by the assault of Haeju, … And second, a more 
fundamental political provocation expressed in terms of the basic nature of 
Syngman Rhee’s regime, its declared policies towards the North, and the 
indications of a hardening commitment by the U.S. towards this same 
regime.21   
(2)  Political Rivalry in the North. Robert Simmons finds the 
cause of the Korean War in political rivalry in the North. He says, “However, the specific 
timing of the June 25 invasion was caused by intense intra-Korean Worker’s Party 
(KWP) rivalry in the north, combined with appeals from South Korean-based guerillas 
who had powerful supporters in the North.”22 Selig S. Harrison concludes that Kim Il 
Sung as a primary actor was responsible for the Korean War and rivalry in the north was 
the cause of the Korean War. He says, “Historians have now established beyond doubt 
that it was Kim Il Sung, not Stalin, who instigated the invasion, primarily in response to 
an internal factional challenge from his most significant rival for control of the ruling 
Workers Party in the North, Pak Hon Young, who was later purged.”23 
b.  Counterargument 
Jung Byung-joon, a professor at Mokpo National University in South 
Korea, contradicts the “trap” or “Haeju seizure” theory in his 2006 book, The Korean 
War: Confrontations at the 38th Parallel and the Formation of the War.  He concludes 
that a surprise attack by North Korea, in accordance with support from Stalin, was the 
beginning of the Korean War.24  He claims that Bruce Cumings’ argument has two 
shortcomings. First, he argues that Bruce Cumings did not refer to declassified document 
from Russia and North Korea before he wrote his 2 volumes, The Origins of the Korean 
War, in 1981 and 1990. According to the Russian documents declassified in 1994, the 
Soviet Union finally agreed to support Kim Il-Sung’s decision to attack South Korea and 
                                                 
21 Gupta, 714.  
22 Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the 
Korean Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 103.  
23 Harrison, xiii. 
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played a certain role in making the decision. Second, the Haeju situation is not clear 
because the first and second battalions of the 17th regiment from Ongjin had already been 
defeated and their communications were lost.25 On 26 June 1950, the Defense Ministry of 
South Korea made a wrong announcement that Haeju was occupied by the South Korean 
Army and the United States Far East Command believed that the South Korean Army had 
taken Haeju on 28 June 1950.26  
Jung found new South Korean and North Korean documents at the U.S. 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in 2001. Based on those new 
Korean documents, he says, the South Korean Army command directed the 17th regiment 
to follow Operation Command 38, which was not an attack plan but part of regular 
defense planning made by the South Korean Army.27  The order was issued on the 
morning of 25 June 1950 after North Korea had already launched its attack at dawn and 
the 17th regiment had been defeated. 28  Without any evidence due to the loss of 
communications, however, the South Korean government believed that the 17th regiment 
might retaliate for a North Korean attack and even hid the real situation from the public. 
In reality, the 17th regiment was totally lost at the battle and some members showed up at 
the Inchon port several days after North Korean attack, on 28 June 1950.29  
The bottom line is that there has been confusion over the battle situation 
on 25 June 1950 because of both Operation Command 38 developed by the South Korean 
army in March 1950 and the South Korean government’s lies about the battle in the 
Heaju area without any clear evidence. Several scholars such as I. F. Stone, Karunakar 
Gupta, and Bruce Cumings have developed their “trap” or “Haeju seizure” theory from 
these unclear situations. Actually, the South Korean Army had not prepared any massive 
or provocative attack against North Korea.                                                   
25 Jung Byung-joon, Hangukjeonjaeng: 38seon chungdonggwa jeonjaengui hyeongseong [The Korean 
War: Confrontations at the 38th parallel and the Formation of the War] (Paju, Kyronggi Province: 
Dolbegae, 2006), 71. 
26 Ibid.  
27  Bae, Young-dae,“6.25 ‘Namchim Youdoseol’ Chomokchomok Banbak (Refuting the Korean War 
provocation theory one by one)” Joongang Ilbo, 25 June 2006, 
http://article.joins.com/article/viewaid.asp?ctg=&aid=2741433 (accessed on 30 August 2006). 
28 Jung Byung-joon, Hangukjeonjaeng: 38seon chungdonggwa jeonjaengui hyeongseong [The Korean 
War: Confrontations at the 38th parallel and the Formation of the War], 74. 
29 Ibid., 75. 
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B. THE ROOTS OF THE KOREAN WAR 
The root cause of the Korean War was Kim Il Sung’s miscalculation and a power 
struggle among North Korean leaders. But, other external causes need to be considered to 
understand the Korean War as a whole. Domestic actors struggling for power on the 
Korean peninsula became connected with Great Power competition as the United States 
and the Soviet Union began to search for support for their interests. That is, there are 
many causes of the Korean War. It is like a “chain of errors.” If even one in the chain of 
internal or external errors had been disconnected, the Korean War would have been 
prevented. Because there is a lack of explanation in both traditionalist and revisionist 
reasoning, it is necessary to consider carefully all of the internal and external roots and 
understand the relationships between them. 
1.  Internal Roots 
a. Kim  Il-Sung’s Misjudgment  
Kim Il-Sung had believed that Korea could be unified only by force, even 
before the end of the World War II. Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Litai Xue 
introduced Kim Il-Sung’s background in their book, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, 
and the Korean War, “Kim shared his vision of a future Korea with his brigade comrades. 
One of them recalls that the new battalion commander Kim ‘never believed in peaceful 
unification; he never had such an idea. He only stuck to the idea of armed unification.’”30 
This perception led to misjudgment about Korean unification in 1950.  
Kathryn Weathersby has done the most extensive translation of Russian 
documents since declassification in 1994. She concludes that “the Soviet role was 
essential, but it was a facilitator rather than initiator.”31 She introduces an interview of 
Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Litai Xue, with a retired brigadier general of North 
Korea, Chung San-chin, on 13 April 1992. Chung San-chin explained Kim Il-Sung’s 
rationale to persuade Stalin: 
According to the report of Mun, Il, Kim’s translator on the trip to Moscow, 
Kim, Il Sung made four points to persuade Stalin that the United States 
would not participate in the war. First, it would be a decisive surprise 
                                                 
30 Goncharov, Sergei N., Lewis, John W., and Xue, Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the 
Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 131-2. 
31 Harrison, 106. quoted in Weathersby, Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War. 
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attack and the war would be won in three days; second, there would be an 
uprising of 200,000 communist party members in South Korea; third, the 
guerrillas in the southern provinces would support the Korean People’s 
Army (KPA); and fourth, the US would not have time to participate.32  
This interview was for the book, Uncertain Partners. It is the same as the 
testimony of Yoo Sung Chul, the head of the KPA Operations Directorate published in 
Hangukilbo [Korea Daily] on 9 September 1990.33 According to Yoo Sung Chul, Kim Il-
Sung thought that the occupation of Seoul in three days would be enough to unify 
Korea.34 Yoo Sung Chul said that North Korea only planned three days because Pak Hon 
Youn, Minster of Foreign Affairs and head of the South Korean Workers’ Party (SKWP) 
claimed that 200,000 party members would overthrow the South Korean government 
after the occupation of Seoul.35  
Actually, Kim Il-Sung convened a general meeting of the South Korean 
Assembly members after the occupation of Seoul in order to make Rhee Syngman resign. 
All situations were consistent with the four points that Kim Il-Sung made in order to 
persuade Stalin. However, Kim Il-Sung’s prediction turned out to be a serious 
misjudgment because the war lasted three years instead of three days. There was no 
support from the members of the SKWP and guerillas in the South and the United States 
quickly entered the war.      
b.  No Political Consensus on the Korean Peninsula 
The political situation on the Korean peninsula after World War II was 
total chaos. In 1947, it was impossible to compose a provisional government. Based on 
the report written by Joseph E. Jacobs to George C. Marshall and shown On the Foreign 
Relations of the United States (FRUS), there were three parties and 35 social 
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organizations in the North and over 400 parties in the South.36 In the South, the total 
claimed members of all parties was more than 62 million, which was three times more 
than the entire population in the South.37 According to a brief estimate of the political 
situation in NSC 8, political stability was not achieved. It said, “The tendency of Korean 
political elements to polarize into extremes of right and left and to pursue their ends 
through the use of violence acts as a serious deterrent to the achievement of political 
stability on a democratic basis in Korea.”38   
It is possible to quantify the political situation by referring to “Political 
allegiance of applicants for consultations” made during the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission 
sessions for trusteeship on Korea.39 
 
Table 1.   Political allegiance of applicants for consultations, accepted by USSR (American 
criteria) Source: United States Department of State (USDS) (1960A: 53-4)40 






Right 44 12.483 24.1 
Moderate Right 18 4.029 7.8 
Moderate 9 2.882 5.6 
Moderate Left 6 4.609 8.9 
Left South 41 14.450 27.9 
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Left North 28 13.257 25.6 
Total 146 51.710 100 
During the political chaos before the Korean War, two political 
figures―Yo Un Hyong and Kim Koo―could have worked for unification of Korea and 
have prevented the Korean War. Yo Un Hyong formed the Committee for the Preparation 
of Korean Independence (CPKI) (later the Korean People’s Republic (KPR)) after 
Nobuyuki Abe, the last Japanese Governor General of Korea, transferred power to him 
and asked for protection for all Japanese nationals until their repatriation to Japan.41 Kim 
Young-Sik considers CPKI as “the first and the last true government of the Koreans, by 
the Koreans, and for the Koreans.”42 He adds, “Koreans from all walks of life and 
political ideology worked in harmony, side by side, for the good of Korea. In that brief 
time period, the Korean people proved that they were fully capable of governing their 
own country.”43 The KPR included all nationalist elements both non-Communist and 
Communist.44 Yo’s efforts to create a unifying coalition of all nationalists failed because 
political leaders such as Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo and other conservative leaders stood 
against him.  
Selig S. Harrison explains that the rise of other political leaders was due to 
the sponsoring of the occupation authorities.45 He describes the political situation from 
1945 to 1947 as “an internecine political conflict.” 46 Yo was assassinated by an extreme 
rightist, Han Ji Geun in 1947. If the KPR had established one Korea, the Korean War 
could have been prevented. After Yo’s death, the political and ideological division was 
intensified on the Korean peninsula. The attempts to unify the Right and the Left resulted 
in criticism from both the Communists and non-Communists. In South Korea, a Medal of 
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National Foundation was awarded to Yo Un Hyong posthumously by President Roh Moo 
Hyun in 2005, 60 years after independence. Yo Un Hyong has been treated as a leftist in 
South Korea.  
Another assassination was a result of the political chaos. Kim Koo, the 
former Premier of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) had returned home from 
China on 23 November 1945 and had participated in anti-trusteeship demonstrations 
against the United States and the Soviet Union.47 Like Yo Un Hyong, he wanted to build 
a unified and independent Korea. Thus, he opposed South Korea’s general election in 
1948.48 He expected that the separate election would lead to a civil war and wanted to 
prevent it. During his activities for creating one Korea, he was assassinated on 26 June 
1949 by Ahn Doo Hee, who was killed by Park Ki Seo, a bus driver and one of Kim 
Koo’s followers in 1996.49 Ahn Doo Hee did not reveal the details of the assassination. 
Some argue that it was on Syngman Rhee’s order, or a right-wing conspiracy, and others 
argue that it was a conspiracy of the United States. The motive of assassination is still 
obscure.  
In September 2001, Professor Bang Sun Ju, a Korean-American historian 
and Professor Jung Byong Joon, who was a member of the Korean History Compilation 
Council, found some documents about Ahn Doo Hee at the U.S. National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA). According to their findings, Ahn Doo Hee was an 
employee of the US Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in Korea as well as a member of 
the extreme rightist terrorist group, Baik-yi-sah [White Angels Association] and Yum 
Ung Taek, a head of the extreme right group may have planned Kim Koo’s 
assassination.50    
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After the assassination of two political leaders who were eager to prevent 
the division of Korea, Syngman Rhee became the leader in the South. Meanwhile, Kim Il 
Sung was designated a national leader by the Soviet Union. Both Syngman Rhee and 
Kim Il Sung emerged as competing nationalist leaders bent on uniting the Korean 
peninsula. It was the division of Korea into two competing regimes―each claiming to 
speak for all of Korea―that contributed to the outbreak of a civil war. In sum, there were 
diverse political parties, social organizations and leaders. They manipulated the external 
powers for their own advantages. The five-year internal political chaos finally brought 
about the tragic war. 
2.  External Roots 
a.  Japanese Colony and Pro-Japanese Collaborators 
The Japanese occupation resulted in Koreans who worked for the Japanese. 
The root cause of the conflict among the left, Communists, and the pro-Japanese 
conservatives was Japanese imperialism. The Korean War resulted from the entangled 
struggle among these groups. If the Japanese colonial collaborators had been disciplined 
by a legitimate legal system, there would have been no Korean War. South Korea is still 
trying to deal with the issues of pro-Japanese collaborators in the twenty-first century. 
Eventually, the Korean Assembly passed “the special law on the inspection of 
collaborations of Japanese Imperialism” in May 2005. This was the first legal foundation 
to inspect the collaborators and their actions since the end of Japanese colonial rule in 
1945.  
To implement the special law, the Roh Moo Hyun administration 
established the Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese 
Imperialism (PCIC). This shows that the truth of pro-Japanese and anti-national actions 
had not been clarified earlier. The Chairman of PCIC announced the purpose of PCIC: 
“despite the end of the colonial rule in Korea 60 years ago, it has been great national 
shame in our history not to punish traitors of the people. Now preparing the start of a new 





Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism is a historical mission which cannot be delayed 
any more.” 51 This law should have been passed 60 years ago and could have prevented 
the Korean War.  
Lee Hwal-woong, former Foreign Service officer for the South Korean 
government and currently a Fellow at Korea 2000, a Los Angeles based research council 
on Korean reunification, defines the Korean War as a conflict between “anti-Japanese 
and pro-Japanese forces.” 52  Lee argues that the United States helped pro-Japanese 
collaborators to contain the left:  
With the end of World War II, the United States divided the peninsula and 
proclaimed an anticommunist military government in the southern half. It 
then helped the coalition of right wing elements and pro-Japanese 
collaborators to establish the Seoul government. Unable to secure a 
political foothold in Seoul, the left wing elements, many of them by then 
sworn communists, set up the Pyongyang government with Soviet blessing. 
Thus, one Korea became two Koreas: one run by anti-Japanese and the 
other by pro-Japanese forces.53 
The decisions made by the United States after World War II determined 
the fundamental political structure in Korea. Bruce Cumings says that “The Americans 
were operating through the existing Japanese structures and using employees both in the 
government and the police who violated the strictures against former collaborations.”54 
Many of the conservative elite had collaborated with the Japanese during the colonial 
period. They opposed major postwar reforms to Korean society such as land reform and 
the purging of colonial collaborators.55 Lieutenant General John Hodge, the head of the 
US occupation force, retained the colonial power structure to contain the left.56 Pro-
Japanese collaborators, especially the colonial police force, could work again. This policy 
brought further complications.  
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b.  Division of Korea before the Korean War  
(1)  Trusteeship. A five-year trusteeship was decided on by the 
United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in Moscow in December 1945. 
Part of Section three of the Moscow Agreement reads as follows: 
3. It shall be the task of the joint commission, with the participation of the 
provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic 
organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting 
(trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean 
people, the development of democratic self-government and the 
establishment of the national independence of Korea. 
The proposals of the joint commission shall be submitted, following 
consultation with the provisional Korean Government for the joint 
consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an 
agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up 
to five years.57    
Two Korean scholars, Syn Song Kil and Sin Sam Soon, blame 
Stalin for the establishment of trusteeship. They said, “It should be noticed that since the 
decision on trusteeship was adopted in Moscow, the criticism-charging lack of faith in 
and respect for the Korean people and the infringement on Korea’s independence and 
national sovereignty--was aimed mainly at Stalin. As it turned out, he was indeed 
responsible for the establishment of trusteeship over Korea.”58 
This trusteeship policy was considered by the Roosevelt 
administration. Roosevelt and his advisors thought that the success of its postwar policy 
in Asia would require a stable government in Korea.59  An international trusteeship for 
Korea was considered as “an effort to eliminate this strategic area as a potential source of 
tension and conflict in the postwar world.”60 On the other hand, Bruce Cumings argues 
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that “Roosevelt’s policy toward Korea, as toward Indochina, was trusteeship. This 
quintessential internationalist device was meant to accommodate postwar American 
security concerns, open the colonies to American commerce and tutelage, and corral 
communist and anticolonial revolution.”61  
Steven Hugh Lee explained why the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union supported the trusteeship framework. According to Lee, 
the trusteeship favored “American new liberal imperialism, which downplayed 
protectionism and emphasized increased access to markets, low tariffs, and an ‘open 
door’ economic policy.”62 The United Kingdom recognized the United States as the 
strongest power after World War II and supported the decision. The Soviet Union agreed 
to a trusteeship because it expected that a unified Korea would be friendly toward 
Moscow.63 
Korean reaction was “immediate and hostile.”64 When Roosevelt’s 
trusteeship policy for Korea was recommended in December 1942, Kim Koo, the 
president of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in Chungking, declared that 
“Korea must secure her…absolute independence. Korea’s political experience was of 
longer duration than Japan.”65  After the Moscow agreement, there was “a storm of 
protest.”66 The Anti-Trusteeship movement started in December 1945 and continued until 
the U.S.-Soviet Joint Committee was dissolved in August 1947.  
Lee Chul Seung, chairperson for the National Committee of 
Liberty and Democracy, said in 2003 that “The anti-trustee movement could be 
considered as the second independence movement for Korea.”67 Also, he said, “The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and superiority of the South Korean system to North 
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Korea’s are evidence that justify spirits of independence, democracy and unification of 
the anti-trusteeship movement.” 68   The trusteeship policy split Korean into two 
groups―anti-trusteeship groups and pro-trusteeship groups. The Communists and 
members of the extreme left denounced trusteeship for all Koreans, but they reversed 
their position and supported the Moscow Agreement because the Soviet Union most 
likely ordered them to switch.69 Even though the Koreans had not experienced self-
government, international guidance would not have been required. Without a trusteeship 
policy, the conflict between pro-trusteeship groups and anti-trusteeship groups, as well as 
the Korean War, would not have happened on the Korean peninsula.   
(2)  38th Parallel. The United States and the Soviet Union 
divided the country along the 38th parallel with each primarily concerned with its own 
occupation zone. Without the 38th parallel, there would have been no Korean War. The 
hasty adoption of the 38th parallel as the dividing line on the Korean peninsula showed 
the lack of foresight about the almost permanent division of Korea because the 38th 
parallel still exists. 
On 10 August 1945, Soviet forces moved toward northern Korea 
and there was an all-night meeting in the Executive Office Building next to the White 
House. 70  Lieutenant Colonels Dean Rusk, later Secretary of State under Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson, and Charles Bonesteel, later U.S. military commander in Korea, 
were ordered to draw a line across Korea.71 They had not prepared for that task.72 They 
used a National Geographic map and thought that “if the Soviet Union accepted this, 
two-thirds of the country’s population and the capital city, Seoul, would be under 
American administration.”73 Rusk later confessed that the decision was made in haste 
without deep knowledge, 
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Rusk said that neither he nor any of the others involved were aware that at 
the turn of the century the Russians and Japanese had discussed dividing 
Korean into spheres of influence at the thirty-eighth parallel, a historical 
fact that might have suggested to Moscow that Washington had finally 
recognized this old claim. Had we known that, we almost surely would 
have chosen another line of demarcation.74    
The Soviet Union accepted the 38th parallel proposal. Zhao 
Suisheng explains that the reason for the Soviet acceptance was because “Stalin wished 
to maintain satisfactory relations with the United States if possible.”75 The 38th parallel 
was intended to be temporary, but it has been an almost permanent line dividing Korea 
and even all-out war could not change the line.76   
(3)  Establishment of the ROK and DPRK in 1948. In 1947, the 
United States introduced a resolution in the UN General Assembly for a national 
assembly election in Korea: the Soviet Union boycotted the vote and did not accept the 
resolution. A commission to observe national assembly elections visited Korea and met 
only the representatives of the right. The commission members resisted observing 
elections in the south only, but they gave way to the pressures from “the United States 
and other involved governments.”77 Burton I. Kaufman said “Although unstated at the 
time, the administration’s policy was now clearly one of holding elections in anticipation 
of establishing a separate South Korean government.”78 The position of the United States 
was made by the threat of Communist strength in South Korea. Communists were in a 
better position on the Korean peninsula. A separate regime in the south was considered as 
imperative policy by policy makers in Washington under the circumstances.79 Kaufman 
introduced the report written by Joseph E. Jacobs, 
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In September 1947, Jacobs reported from Seoul that “at least thirty percent 
of the people in South Korea [were] leftists, following the Comintern 
Communist leaders who would support the Soviets behind the United 
States lines.” Once the United States was effectively removed from Korea, 
all kinds of possibilities existed for Communist domination of the entire 
peninsula within a relatively short period.80 
South Korea (the Republic of Korea) was established on 15 August 
1948 and North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) on 9 September 
1948 respectively.81 Kathryn Weathersby explains the establishment of separate states in 
1948 as the result of the external influence, 
The division of the county had been the action of the U.S. and USSR, not 
of Koreans themselves, who had never accepted the division as legitimate 
or permanent. Furthermore, the great powers officially regarded the 
establishment of independent states in the two occupation zones as a 
provisional measure; both occupying powers remained officially 
committed to the establishment of a unified government for Korea.82  
c.  Stalin’s Shift 
Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue had an interview with a high-ranking Soviet 
diplomat who held one of the top positions in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
archive in 1991. According to one senior Soviet diplomat, “Up to April 1950, Stalin was 
always cautioning Kim Il Sung concerning his plans for military action, but after that he 
for some reason changed his mind and began to push for a military solution very 
actively.” There are several possible reasons for Stalin’s shift. Selig S. Harrison said that 
“Stalin finally yielded to Kim because he mistakenly concluded that the war would not 
take long and would not lead to conflict with the United States.”83  
Kathryn Weathersby shows the documentary evidence of Stalin’s final 
shift to support Kim Il Sung’s decision to attack South Korea. Her conclusion is that 
Stalin changed his mind in the spring of 1950 and agreed to provide military means after 
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having believed that the United States would not intervene.84 She cited one Foreign 
Ministry background report, “On the Korean War, 1950-1953, and the Armistice 
Negotiation,” written in 1966 by staff of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It clearly explains 
Stalin’s involvement in the Korean War,  
In the DPRK, a people’s army was created which in manpower and 
equipment significantly surpassed the armed forces of South Korea. By 
January 1, 1950, the total number of DPRK troops was 110,000; new 
divisions were hastily being formed.  
Calculating that the USA would not enter a war over South Korea, Kim Il 
Sung persistently pressed for a agreement from Stalin and Mao Zedong to 
reunify the country by military means. (telegrams #4-51, 233, 1950).  
Stalin at first treated the persistent appeals of Kim Il Sung with reserve, 
noting that “such a large affair in relation to South Korea… needs much 
preparation,” but he did not object in principle. The final agreement to 
support the plans of the Koreans was given by Stalin at the time of Kim Il 
Sung’s visit to Moscow in March-April 1950. Following this, in May, Kim 
Il Sung visited Beijing and secured the support of Mao.  
The Korean government envisioned realizing its goal in three stages: 
1) concentration of troops near the 38th parallel,  
2) issuing an appeal to the South for peaceful unification, and  
3) initiating military activity after the South’s rejection of the proposal for 
peaceful unification. 
At Stalin’s order, all requests of the North Koreans for delivery of arms 
and equipment for the formation of additional units of the KPA were 
quickly met. The Chinese leadership sent to Korea a division formed from 
Koreans who had been serving in the Chinese army, and promised to send 
food aid and to transfer one army closer to Korea “in case the Japanese 
enter on the side of South Korea.” (telegram 362, 1950) 
By the end of May 1950 the General Staff of the KPA together with Soviet 
Military advisers announced the readiness of the Korean army to begin 
concentration at the 38th parallel. At the insistence of Kim Il Sung, the 
beginning of military activity was scheduled for June 25, 1950. (telegram 
408.1950)85  
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It is clear that Kim Il Sung requested Soviet support and Stalin’s support 
was important for the Korean War. After Stalin’s shift, the Soviet Union sent military 
advisers to draft the battle plan.86 Yoo Sung Chul, a retired North Korean lieutenant 
general translated the operational plan after Kim Il Sung returned to Korea.87 The Soviet 
role in drafting the plan shows Stalin’s shift and support. 
According to Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, the reason for Stalin’s shift was 
not simple and there are several aspects of explanations. They said, 
…we believed his reasoning was far more complex…. Stalin would have 
concluded from press reports and intelligence that, though the Americans 
might want to aid Taiwan or even South Korea, it would take them many 
months to amass and get that aid to the western Pacific. The timing was on 
Kim’s side if he moved quickly and decisively. In the worst case, the U.S. 
intervention would lead to a clash between Beijing and Washington and a 
denial of Taiwan to the Chinese Communists. The resulting rise in Sino-
American hostilities would only increase Mao’s reliance on Stalin….. 
Thus, we would argue, it was a mixture of short- and long-term estimates 
of the U.S. posture in Asia, as of April 1950, that finally led Stalin to 
become directly involved in Kim’s military designs. In doing so, as we 
have remarked, the Soviet dictator would be pursuing his goals on several 
levels-to expand the buffer zone along his border, to create a springboard 
against Japan that could be used during a future global conflict, to test the 
American resolve, to intensify the hostility between Beijing and 
Washington, and, finally and foremost, to draw U.S. power away from 
Europe.88 
A structural change of the international system in 1950 would also have 
played a role in Stalin’s shift. 
d. The U.S. Policy on Korea after World War II 
There was American-Soviet competition outside of Asia after World War 
II. As reflected by NSC 8, Korea was a place of limited American interests before 1950. 
NSC 8 focused on the withdrawal of occupation forces and encouraged UN participation 
in the Korean problem, 
3. In light of the foregoing, it is concluded that: 
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a. It should be the effort of the U.S. Government through all proper means 
to effect a settlement of the Korean problem which would enable the U.S. 
to withdraw from Korea as soon as possible with the minimum of bad 
effects… 
c. The U.S. should be prepared to proceed with the implementation of 
withdrawal, following the formation of a government in south Korea, such 
withdrawal to be phased in consonance with the accomplishment of the 
objectives outlined herein and the relevant commitments of the U.S. vis-à-
vis the UN. Every effort should be made to create conditions for the 
withdrawal of occupation forces by 31 December 1948… 
e. The U.S. should encourage UN interest and participation in the Korean 
problem and should continue to cooperate with the UN in the solution of 
that problem.  
f. The U.S. should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean 
situation that any action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other 
power in Korea could be considered a casus belli for the U.S.89 
Later, several competitive trends between the United States and the Soviet 
Union influenced the decision making of the United States. The rebirth of the Comintern 
in 1947, the Berlin blockade, the first Soviet Atomic bomb test in 1949, and the Chinese 
revolution in 1949 were perceived as the expansion of Communism and NSC 68 was 
created and committed the United States to the defense of Asia. In NSC 68, atomic 
capabilities of the Soviet Union were immediate threats and more than ever a substantial 
military increase was recommended,  
The foregoing analysis indicates that the probable fission bomb capability 
and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union have 
greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United 
States….the United States must have substantially increased general air, 
ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses 
to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that 
it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its 
objectives.90 
Some scholars argue that the limited strategic importance of Korea to the 
United States before the Korean War gave a wrong signal to Kim Il Sung. Cho Soon 
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Sung points to two pieces of evidence―Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s speech to the 
National Press Club on 12 January 1950 and the chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Tom Connelly’s public prediction in U.S. News & World Report, 
on 5 May 1950.91 According to the speech of Secretary of State Acheson, Korea was not 
included in the line of his “defensive perimeter. He said, 
This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes 
to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu 
Islands. We will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under 
trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the 
defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held. The 
defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands… 92  
He also said that “the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to 
resist it.”93  Cho said that “He hinted that the United States would probably not intervene 
in the event of large-scale military conflict, since Korea was not ‘very important.’”94 
Senator Tom Connally stated publicly that “Korea was not an indispensable part of the 
U.S. defense strategy.”95 
Kathryn Weathersby introduces an interview of Sergei Goncharov, John 
Lewis, and Litai Xue, with a retired brigadier general of North Korea, Chung San-Chin, 
on 13 April 1992. “Chung also said that the Acheson speech was known and ‘produced a 
certain influence on Kim Il-Sung.’”96  Kim Il Sung cannot answer whether he decided on 
the attack because of those public statements. But, if Dean Acheson had included Korea 
in the U.S. Defense line and Tom Connelly had stated the administration’s strong 
commitment to intervene should North Korea attack South Korea, the possibility of North 
Korea’s attack would have decreased and the Korean War might have been prevented. 
C. SUMMARY 
Because the Korean War has domestic and international roots, it has been 
described as “a civil war, an exercise in collective security, a forgotten war, an 
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international conflict, a necessary war, a police action, a proxy war, and a revolutionary 
struggle.”97  In order to understand the meaning of domestic and international roots of the 
Korean War, the most appropriate definition of the Korean War is “internationalized civil 
war.”98 The fact that the Korean peninsula has been technically at war since 1953 is 
evidence of how difficult it has been to solve the Korean conflict. Nobody had expected 
this long division. The 1953 Armistice Agreement has not been replaced with a peace 
treaty, which must be the very first step of the Korean unification. It will provide an 
opportunity to make a gradual integration of the two Koreas and release the tension 
between South Korea and North Korea. It is necessary to be patient and cautious because 
North Korea will not quickly let down its guard. David C. Kang warns of the danger of 
rapid change on the Korean peninsula,  
Slow change is not bad―rapid change on the peninsula will be dangerous. 
The stakes are high―war or even chaos in North Korea could end up 
involving four major powers and costing billions of dollars and millions of 
lives, many of them American. Because the stakes are so high, it is all the 
more imperative that the United States remain patient, take the long-term 
view, avoid outdated cold war caricatures, and deal with North Korea as it 
is.99   
In the twentieth century, the Koreans had not decided their destiny for themselves. 
For example, the Taft-Katsura Agreement between the United States and Japan of 1905 
was a secret trade-off to assure American hegemony in the Philippines in exchange for 
United States acquiescence to the Japanese conquering of Korea.100 After that, Japan 
ruled Korea for thirty-six years. This made Korea weak and brought on the Korean War. 
A sovereign and independent Korea was promised by the major powers – the United 
States, China, and Great Britain – in the 1943 Cairo Declaration. Also, the Korean War 
was ended by the United States led U.N., China, and North Korea―not by South Korea. 
All these cases show intervention in Korea by other external countries. 
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In the twenty-first century, the international community must deal with issues left 
behind from the chaos of World War II in order to develop a more peaceful world. The 
official end of the Korean War will be one of the symbolic changes in the development in 
the international community. Bruce Cumings concluded his book, Korea’s Place in the 
Sun, with the future unified Korea’s liberty. 
Perhaps a century of conflict and turmoil, with millions of lives lost, will 
still have been worth it if a unified Korea has liberty as Koreans define it 
(chayu): Liberty as a nation and liberty for its people to be what they want 
to be.101  
It is the most important thing to understand about the internal and external roots 
of the Korean War because the lessons must be learned for a peaceful Korean peninsula.  
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III. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL SETTING ON THE 
KOREAN PENINSULA: NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR STANDOFF  
North Korea conducted a nuclear test on 9 October 2006. The nuclear test was 
analyzed and found to have produced “a low yield of less than one kiloton.”102 The 
solutions for North Korea’s nuclear crisis have not been found. There seems to be no 
clear answer for the motivations of the North Korean nuclear test and solutions for it. It 
makes Korean unification more difficult and complex. Korean unification seems far more 
remote with a nuclear North Korea. The objective of this chapter is to describe and clarify 
the internal and external roots of North Korea’s nuclear program in order to understand 
why North Korea developed it and to find the solutions for a peaceful Korean unification 
in the future. 
What were the main motivations for North Korea’s nuclear program? The 
development of North Korea’s nuclear weapon cannot be tied to one specific reason. It was 
largely the result of the international context unfavorable to North Korea intertwined with 
indigenous reasons. This meant that North Korea’s nuclear development fed into and was 
impacted by both internal and external factors. Domestic motivations seeking security, 
independence, and sovereignty intertwined with international isolation and economic 
difficulty in North Korea after the end of the Cold War.  
North Korean nuclear development emerged from domestic efforts seeking 
independence and security after the Korean War. It eventually came to be a real problem and 
to have international significance after the end of the Cold War. This thesis argues that the 
reason for the various explanations is that North Korea’s nuclear program arose from a 
number of motivations, not just one. Just like the Korean War, the reasons for the nuclear 
development cannot be explained only by internal factors but must also include external 
factors.   
The motivations of North Korea’s nuclear program will be divided into internal and 
external groups. Each explanation will produce the possible assumptions and reasons for its 
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position, but one approach cannot explain all of the motivations. Like the roots of the Korean 
War, the secret to understanding the roots of North Korea’s nuclear program is to combine 
those approaches. Based on those explanations, this thesis will propose the solutions for 
North Korea’s nuclear crisis and for peaceful Korean unification. Because the motivations of 
the nuclear program can be explained by both internal and external factors, solutions for 
Korean unification must be not only Korean efforts, but also international cooperation and 
support.  
A. INTERNAL ROOTS 
1.  Political Factors to Hold on to Power  
 The primary concern of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il is to hold on power. To 
do this, it is necessary to maintain the support of the military. It is useful to use external 
threats and rely on military forces to press any movement in opposition to his power. 
Since the end of the Cold War, a North Korean attack has become less plausible. 
According to the analysis of Chanlett-Avery and Squassoni, “…the test may have been 
intended to appease hardliners in the regime. In the wake of the partially failed missile 
tests in July 2006, the military leadership in North Korea may have pressed for another 
indication of their resolve.”103   
Victor D. Cha brings evidence of a low possibility of North Korea’s invasion for 
hegemonic unification, “A low-key but very significant event at the September 1998 
session of the Supreme People’s Assembly (1st session, 10th term) was abolition of the 
Unification Committee.”104 According to Cha, “Russian observers note that among the 
core principles that have made up the juche (self-reliant) ideology, emphasis has shifted 
recently from universal ‘communization’ to ‘self-dependency’ as the ultimate 
revolutionary goal.”105 Also, North Korea’s limited economic capability cannot support a 
successful invasion of the South. To maintain political power based on juche (self-reliant) 
ideology is Kim Jong-Il’s primary goal.  
North Korea has provoked skirmishes to create tension and take advantage of the 
consequences for political reason. This is “coercive bargaining” strategy. If North Korea 
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has nuclear weapons, “coercive bargaining” strategy after skirmishes would be more 
effective and advantageous to North Korea. According to Victor D. Cha, coercive 
strategy “derives from the preemptive/preventive logic.”106 He says that “This strategy 
does not advocate all-out war. Rather it utilizes deliberate, limited acts of violence to 
create small crises and then negotiate down from the heightened state of tension to a 
bargaining outcome more to the North’s advantage than the status quo.”107 If coercive 
bargaining is North Korea’s intention, then there is a high chance of violence resulting. 
Based on this strategy, Kim Jong-Il can maximize the internal unity and pressure any 
internal opposite movements.  
South Korea and North Korea made a “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization 
of the Korean Peninsula” in 1992 after the agreement on “Reconciliation, Non-
Aggression, Exchange and Cooperation.”108 After the establishment of that 1992 Basic 
Agreement, there have been three skirmishes between South Korea and North Korea. 
First, in September 1996, there was a submarine incursion on the east coast of South 
Korea. A South Korean cab driver noticed a group of men and a strange object and 
reported it to local police. The strange object was a thirty-seven-yard-long North Korean 
submarine of the Shark class.109  Eleven North Korean infiltrators committed suicide to 
avoid being captured and thirteen were killed in firefights.110 One of the North Koreans, 
Lee Kwang-su was captured. Second, on 14 June 1999, there was an exchange of gunfire 
in the West Sea and one North Korean patrol boat was sunk and another one was badly 
damaged by South Korean warships.111  Third, on 29 June 2002, there was a naval 
skirmish near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea. There were scores of 
casualties on both sides; six South Koreans died and 18 were injured.112 The sea border  
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was not clearly delineated at the end of the Korean War and North Korea refuses to 
recognize the NLL drawn by the US-led UN command.113 Mutual trust is impossible 
after these bloody conflicts.  
North Korea did not get any benefit from these skirmishes except more solidified 
and isolated state of North Korea, which helps Kim Jong-Il remain in power. Therefore, 
one possible reason for low-level conflicts might be found in domestic politics. Kim 
Jong-Il must have the loyalty of the North Korean military in order to maintain his power. 
Low-level conflict under the nuclear umbrella could be used as a means to pursue “strong 
and great nation (kangsong taeguk)” and “military first” policy.  However, it is very 
vague how much benefit North Korea would gain from low-level conflict. 
2.  Economic Difficulty   
In the 1990s, millions died in North Korea from its collapsing economy and 
resulting serious food shortages. People had to check with neighbors to see who was still 
alive. There were many refugees along the North Korea-China border. Estimates of the 
numbers of refugees are from 10,000 to 300,000. The U.S. State Department estimated 
from 30,000 to 50,000 in June 2005.114 Becker’s anecdote in his book, Rogue State: Kim 
Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea, show the horrific reality in North Korea,  
A year earlier, in 1996, I stopped at one border village where everyone 
spoke of the pitiful letters that arrived pleading for aid. A man, who had 
just retured from DPRK, pulled from his pocket dozens of tiny pieces of 
paper rolled up, or folded small enough to be swallowed in an emergency. 
Strangers on the other side had begged him to deliver them to their 
relatives. He unrolled one at random: “The children are fine. Grandfather 
and grandmother are alive but we spend a lot of money on grain. Since 
February some relatives have died. On March 19, your uncle died. On 
April 15, cousin Choi died because even retired soldiers do not get 
anything to eat. In May, we will go to Namyang [a border town] and wait 
for you. We need 220 pounds of wheat and 440 pounds of corn. We have 
no choice but to beg for your help.”115 
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Oberdorfer explains the different economic conditions between South Korea and 
North Korea by comparing the food conditions,  
The UN agency reported that the DPRK government had reduced rations 
under its public distribution program to 300 grams (10.5 ounces) of grain 
per person per day, about 1,000 calories. The UN minimum standard for 
refugees was 1,900 calories per day. In South Korea, by contrast, food was 
so plentiful that the National Institute of Health and Social Affairs 
reported after an extensive survey that one in every four adults was on a 
diet to avoid putting on excess weight.116 
Growth in estimated real gross domestic product (GDP) in North Korea was 
negative for most of the 1990s. In 2002 and 2003, growth was about 1.2% and 1.8% 
respectively.117 North Korea’s strategy is to exchange the nuclear program for impressive 
economic inducements. The most urgent need to avoid economic collapse is the 
acquisition of food for the starving population. The 1993 and 1994 nuclear crises were 
related to economic problems.  
3.  Competition with South Korea in International Recognition 
South Korea and North Korea have claimed their legitimacy as the true 
government of the Korean people. North Korea has been losing in most competing areas, 
especially international recognition. The 1988 Seoul Olympics was a turning point in 
South and North Competition. Also, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon’s 
inauguration as UN Secretary General on 14 December 2006 means South Korea is 
winning the legitimacy competition of the Korean people. 118  The disadvantageous 
position of North Korea in competition with South Korea might have led to the nuclear 
weapons program.    
a.  1988 Seoul Olympic 
After South Korea’s Olympic victory over Japan in 1981, North Korea 
expressed its concern about the development of South Korea. Nodong Sinmun said, 
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“Recently South Korean military fascists have been mobilizing high-ranking officials and 
related staff of the puppet government as well as pro-government trumpeters to raise a 
ridiculous hullabaloo every day about the Olympics, which are said to be going to be held 
in Seoul in 1988. Now the puppets of South Korea are approaching socialist nations and 
nonaligned countries in the hope of establishing diplomatic and official relations in order 
to have their ‘state’ recognized as a legitimate one.”119 It shows that North Korea worried 
about its fading claims of legitimacy as the true Korean government.  
North Korea tried to halt the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games in an extreme 
way. North Korean espionage agents, Kim Seung Il and Kim Hyun Hui, destroyed 
Korean Air Lines flight 858 on 29 November 1987.120 They said that “the order came 
directly from Kim Jong-Il, son of the North Korean president, and that its aim was to 
dissuade the nations of the world from participating in the Seoul Olympics.”121  Despite 
North Korea’s interruption, the 1988 Seoul Olympics were a tremendous success story. 
160 nations participated in the games and all games were broadcasting worldwide except 
to North Korea. The 1988 Seoul Olympics were a total victory of South Korea over North 
Korea.   
b. Status in the United Nations 
North Korea declared its nuclear test plan when the South Korean Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade topped informal polls for the next U.N. Secretary General in 
September 2006. North Korea announced its nuclear test on 9 October 2006 several days 
before the United Nations’ General Assembly appointed Ban Ki Moon to that body’s 
highest post on 13 October 2006.122  This might be a coincidence, but it is symbolic to 
show that North Korea has lost in competition with South Korea in the United Nations. 
Ban Ki Moon will have to play a leading role in imposing U.N. sanctions on North Korea 
and preventing proliferation. On 14 October 2006, the United Nations Security Council 
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passed a resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear test.123 North 
Korea’s degraded status in the United Nations shows the failure of North Korea in 
competition with South Korea.      
4.  A Substitute for Conventional Forces   
Even though there are many arguments about North Korea’s capability, it is clear 
that North Korean leaders felt the necessity of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence 
and substitute for conventional forces. South Korea’s developing military capability and 
upgrade of USFK might have led North Korea to consider nuclear weapons.   
a.  The Cost of the Military  
The problem with maintaining conventional forces is cost. Nuclear 
deterrence was used as the only way to reduce those costs. According to North Korea’s 
news service, Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), “The intention to build up a nuclear 
deterrent is not aimed to threaten and blackmail others but to reduce conventional 
weapons…to channel manpower resources and funds into economic construction and the 
betterment of people’s living.” 124  Lawrence Freeman explains the problem with 
conventional forces and substitution of nuclear power for conventional firepower. 
The only way to reduce costs without reneging on commitments was to 
relax the inhibitions surrounding nuclear use and to substitute nuclear for 
conventional firepower. In 1952, the British government had already 
concluded that the best bet for the West in its confrontation with the East 
was to rely on nuclear deterrence.125  
Because of the expense to expand the army, North Korea might have 
intended to substitute nuclear for conventional power.  Victor Cha said, “they fear the 
growing disparity in the balance of forces on the peninsula in favor of the United States and 
South Korea.”126 North Korea appears to have opted to purchase a nuclear deterrence 
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capability after the end of the Cold War.127 North Korea must have shifted from the 
offensive orientation of the 1980s to a deterrence and defense-oriented doctrine and 
North Korea leaders would have thought nuclear weapons posed a firm deterrent measure 
with low cost in the 1990s. 
b.  The Deterioration of North Korea’s Military Capabilities in the 
1990s 
However, North Korea’s massive conventional warfare capability might 
be a credible threat. The warning time for a North Korean artillery shell attacking Seoul, 
which is the fifth largest city in the world with more than ten million people would be 
less than a minute. North Korea’s midrange missiles can be delivered to South Korea and 
to the bases of the United States Forces in Korea and Japan. A nuclear attack on Seoul 
would create total chaos. The July 4 2006 missile test suggested that the threat to the 
American homeland remains unclear because of the failure of Taepodong-2. In the 1980s, 
North Korea signaled an immediate offensive invasion threat by mechanization and 
changes in structure and organization.128  
North Korea’s conventional warfighting capability had been the clear 
threat, but North Korea has developed its nuclear program because of the deterioration of 
its conventional military capability. The threat posed by North Korea in the 1980s 
diminished in the 1990s because North Korea’s military capabilities deteriorated as “a 
result of severe resource constraints.”129  Victor D. Cha introduces a Defense Intelligence 
Agency study on North Korean conventional warfighting capabilities, “North Korea’s 
capability to successfully conduct complex, multi-echelon, large-scale operations to 
reunify the Korean peninsula declined in the 1990s. This was, in large measure, the result 
of severe resource constraints, including widespread food and energy shortages.”130  
Since the end of the Cold War, North Korean leaders have not considered 
that its conventional warfighting capabilities are enough to deter the United States and 
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South Korea. North Korea’s military capability has declined since the 1990s. During the 
Gulf War in 1991, North Korea was stunned by the use of the superior conventional 
weapons of the United States. North Korea’s weaponry was very similar to that of Iraq at 
the time. Lacking military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union and China, 
North Korea could not modernize its conventional forces. Several scholars support the 
idea that North Korea uses its nuclear program to offset its degraded military capability. 
Selig S. Harrison summarizes North Korea’s change, 
Pyongyang has responded with nuclear and missile programs designed 
both to deter any United States use of nuclear weapons in Korea and to 
neutralize the superiority of South Korean airpower over its aging Mig 
force. Unless the United States joins in a denuclearization of Korea and in 
arms-control agreements that reduce or remove the threat of a preemptive 
strike by United States aircraft, North Korea is unlikely to foreclose the 
development of its nuclear and missile capabilities.  
John Pike, a defense analyst at GlobalSecurity.org, argues that the North 
Korean army is not the main threat, “As long as the war was conventional, I don’t think 
North Korea would do much better than Iraq did.”131 North Korea has felt the disparity in 
conventional forces and has focused on its nuclear program. 
c.  A Case of Substitution for Conventional Forces: Pakistan 
North Korea has placed a high priority on developing missiles to offset the 
conventional military advantages of South Korea and the United States. A main goal of 
this effort is to ensure the reliable delivery of nuclear weapons. North Korea has not been 
able to update most of its military assets for the past decade, but its missiles development 
continues. Pakistan has pursued a similar nuclear strategy, which may be instructive. 
Peter R. Lavoy and Stephen A. Smith said, “Although the Pakistan Air Force F-16 and 
Mirage 5 aircraft probably are capable of nuclear delivery, the liquid-fuel Ghauri 1 and 2 
missiles developed with North Korean assistance, and the solid-fuel Shaheen 1 and 2 
missiles developed with Chinese help, are more likely choices.”132  
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B. EXTERNAL ROOTS 
1. Deterrence and Defense-Oriented Doctrine for Regime Survival from 
the United States’ Threat 
First of all, from a North Korean perspective, North Korea’s nuclear program is a 
matter of regime survival. North Korea has requested security assurance and a bilateral 
peace treaty with the United States as a precondition of no nuclear weapons development. 
North Korea has been threatened by the United States, especially since the end of the 
Cold War and the “Axis of Evil” statement after 9/11. North Korea would consider 
regime survival as a primary nuclear strategy as long as the United States maintains this 
hard-line policy.  
a.  North Korea’s Request for a Security Guarantee 
North Korean leaders repeatedly state that they are willing to restrict their 
nuclear program if the United States guarantees the country’s security. When James 
Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State, visited Pyongyang in October 2002, Kang Sok-ju, 
first vice-minister for foreign affairs acknowledged the nuclear program and requested 
security assurance. Kang said, “If the United States recognized North Korea’s system of 
government, concluded a peace agreement pledging non-aggression and did not interfere 
in his country’s economic development, Pyongyang would seriously discuss U.S. 
concerns about the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program.”133 Charles L. Pritchard 
introduces an interesting discussion between Kim Jong-Il and Madeleine Albright, former 
US secretary state in October 2000: 
He told her that in the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, was able 
to conclude that China faced no external security threat and could 
accordingly refocus its resources on economic development. With the 
appropriate security assurances, Mr. Kim said, he would be able to 
convince his military that the US was no longer a threat and then be in a 
similar position to refocus his country’s resources.134  
Two weeks after North Korea’s admission about having an HEU program in 
October 2002. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry spokesman explained that the United 
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States’ hostile policy was the cause of their nuclear program and requested a non-
aggression treaty between North Korea and the United States: 
As far as the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is concerned, it 
cropped up as the United States has massively stockpiled nuclear weapons 
in South Korea and its vicinity and threatened the DPRK, a small country, 
with those weapons for nearly half a century, pursuing a hostile policy 
toward it in accordance with the strategy for world supremacy…. If the 
United States legally assures the DPRK of nonaggression, including the 
nonuse of nuclear weapons against it by concluding such treaty, the DPRK 
will be ready to clear the former of its security concerns.135 
Based on North Korea’s request for the security assurance, regime survival seems 
to be the primary motive of the nuclear program.  
b.  Response to the United States’ Threat   
According to Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow, North Korea’s 
nuclear program is a response to the foreign policy of the United States since the end of 
the Cold War. Interestingly, based on major military operations, they concluded that the 
United States has been very belligerent: 
Consider the extent of U.S. military coercion since the opening of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989. The United States: 
•  invaded Panama and overthrew the government of Manuel Noriega. 
•  devastated Iraq in the first Persian Gulf war 
•  occupied Somalia 
•  forced the government of Haiti from power by threatening to invade the 
country 
•  bombed the Bosnian Serbs into accepting a peace agreement 
•  bombed Yugoslavia into relinquishing control over its province of 
Kosovo 
•  invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban government 
•  attacked and occupied Iraq in the second Persian Gulf war. 
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In all, the United States has conducted eight major military operations in 
fourteen years. That is an extraordinary record of belligerence.136  
They say that it was rational to pursue nuclear weapons to deter an attack by the United 
States, “It is hardly surprising if Pyongyang concluded that it might be next on 
Washington’s hit list unless it could effectively deter an attack.”137    
President Bush, in his 2002 State of the Union address, reinforce this 
impression when he described North Korea as part of an Axis of Evil, 
North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction, while starving its citizens…. States like these, and their 
terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of 
the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a 
grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, 
giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies 
or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price 
of indifference would be catastrophic….I will not wait on events, while 
dangers gather, I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer.”138  
The Washington Post’s Bob Woodward, in his book Bush at War, 
introduces his interview at the President’s ranch in Crawford, Texas in August 2002, and 
explains Bush’s feeling about North Korea, “The President sat forward in his chair. I 
thought he might jump up he became so emotional about the North Korean leader. ‘I 
loathe Kim, Jong Il’ Bush shouted, waving his finger in his air. ‘I’ve got a visceral 
reaction to this guy, because he is starving his people.”139  
From a possible North Korean perspective, these statements might be a 
serious threat to its regime’s survival. North Korea might feel so threatened by the Iraq 
War that it has developed nuclear weapons to prevent the United States from attacking it. 
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c.  Balance of Power against North Korea in the Post-Cold War Era  
South Korea rushed to normalize ties with China and the Soviet Union in 
1991. The Soviet Union established full diplomatic relationships with South Korea on 1 
January 1991 after Gorbachev’s meeting with the former South Korean president, Roh 
Taewoo.140 Even though it was suggested that a special envoy be sent to do a “distasteful 
job,” Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, felt obligated to go himself to 
Pyongyang because he knew that it would be very difficult to convince North Korea to 
accept normalization with South Korea.141  Shevardnadze  argued that “North Korea 
would benefit from Moscow’s diplomatic relations with Seoul because Soviet officials 
would be able to talk directly with the South on North-South issues, the problem of the 
U.S. troops and nuclear weapons, and any other topics of importance to Pyongyang.”142  
The North Korean foreign minister, Kim Young Nam replied that “it 
would reinforce the division of the country and severely aggravate relations between 
Moscow and Pyongyang.” North Korean leaders might have realized that there was a 
change in the balance of power in the post-cold war era. They might have started 
considering a self-reliant nuclear weapon, too.  
China followed the Soviet Union’s lead in moving toward a normal 
relationship with South Korea143 The trade between China and South Korea grew after 
China opened to market economics and came to be seven times larger than its trade with 
North Korea.144 China pushed North Korea to accept the concept of the two Koreas being 
admitted to the United Nations. South and North Korea joined the UN General Assembly 
in 1991. North Korea announced, “It had no choice but to apply for UN 
membership―even though dual membership would be an obstacle to  
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unification―because, otherwise, the South would join the United Nations alone.”145 
North Korea’s new relationship with the Soviet Union and China might have made North 
Korea think about its security.  
Considering the balance of power in Northeast Asia, neorealists would 
argue that “the end of the Cold War left North Korea with no choice but to internally 
counteract the sharp deterioration of the external balance of power.”146 North Korea has 
become more isolated and now relied on its own defense. This change of the relationship 
between China and North Korea has been shown recently. For example, after North 
Korea’s missile test on 4 July 2006, the Chinese leaders were frustrated. The United 
States Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said, “I think the Chinese are as 
baffled as we are by North Korea’s actions. China has done so much for that country and 
that country just seems intent on taking all of China’s generosity and giving nothing 
back.” 147  Yan Xuetong, a professor of international relations at Beijing’s Tsinghua 
University, stated “I think that China is very unhappy with North Korea, which put it in a 
very awkward position. China now feels it is trapped in a game it can’t win.”148  
Sandip Kumar Mishra, a professor in the Department of East Asian studies, 
University of Delhi, India, argues “After the North Korean missile tests, it has become 
more obvious that Pyongyang is not ready to listen to anybody in its resolution to get 
direct to talks with the United States at any cost.”149 Also, North Korea’s refusal to 
participate in the six-party talks between the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the 
United States throws doubt on whether China can play a key role in persuading North 
Korea.150 Paik Hak-soon, a scholar at the Sejong Institute, a North Korea think-tank  
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based in Seoul, said, “Chinese policy is striking a very fine balance between North Korea 
and the United States. If China does not help, the North Korean leadership is determined 
to go in its own way.”151 
Consequently, the end of the Cold War has changed the balance of power against 
North Korea. The changed situations such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic 
development of China, South Korea’s normalization with China and the Soviet Union in 
1991, explain why North Korea seems to have decided to develop a self-reliant nuclear 
deterrence without help from its two Cold War patrons―China and Russia.  
d.  Evidence of North Korea’s Intention – The 1993-1994 Crisis  
 As explained previously, North Korea seems to have been using the 
nuclear program as a means of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. The 1993-1994 
North Korean nuclear crisis shows North Korea’s intention. In January 1993, North 
Korea refused the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to two suspected 
waste depositories. The 1993 Joint Statement by North Korea and the United States 
shows that North Korea’s nuclear strategy is related to regime survival and will be similar 
in the future. From North Korea’s perspective, its main concern has been how to counter 
what it perceives as its greatest external threat―the United States.  
 Therefore, North Korea responded positively when the United States 
demonstrated sensitivity to its regime survival. The first U.S.-North Korea Joint 
Statement of 11 June 1993 says, “its purpose is assurance against the threat and use of 
force, including nuclear weapons, and peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean 
peninsula.”152 This can be interpreted as a U.S. promise not to take military action 
against North Korea and led to North Korea’s agreement not to withdraw from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).153 
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2.  Economic Benefits under Bargaining Strategy  
North Korea has experienced economic difficulty since the mid-1990s.  Based on 
economic perspectives, North Korea is using its nuclear program as a bargaining chip to 
get economic aid from outside.     
a.  The Worsening Situation after the End of the Cold War   
North Korea has used its nuclear program as leverage in asking for help 
from the United States, South Korea and Japan since the end of the Cold War. The end of 
the Cold War and termination of aid from the Soviet Union and China worsened 
economic conditions in North Korea. Several economic figures show the significant 
changes after the collapse of the communist bloc. For example, after the termination of 
Soviet subsidized sales, North Korea’s petroleum imports form the Soviet Union 
decreased by more than half between 1988 (3.4 million tons) and 1992 (1.5 million 
tons).154 Similarly, even though three-fifths of North Korea’s overall trade took place 
with Warsaw Pact countries, it dropped by nearly 33 percent between 1988 and 1991 
“after hard currency terms of customs settlement became required for most 
transactions.”155 
Selig S. Harrison introduces the argument of pragmatists in the North: 
The negative economic impact of the nuclear weapons effort became 
increasingly clear when the end of the cold war led to the end of the Soviet 
and Chinese food and petroleum subsidies. Pragmatists in the North 
argued that the only way to avert an economic collapse was to turn to the 
United States, Japan, and South Korea for help.156  
North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is related to the economic constraints after the 
end of the Cold War.  
b.  Evidence – 1994 Agreed Framework 
 The 1994 Agreed Framework shows that North Korea will use its nuclear 
arsenal as a bargaining chip during negotiations with the United States. The former 
President, Jimmy Carter, visited North Korea to mediate the nuclear crisis in 1993. He 
summarized North Korea’s intentions. According to Carter, Kim Il-sung said, “if the 
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United States had helped North Korea then to acquire a light water reactor, even from a 
third country, the current problems could have been avoided. If the U.S. would now agree 
to a third round of talks and help North Korea to get light water reactors, there would be 
no problems. If a commitment is made to furnish us with a light water reactor, then we 
will immediately freeze all our nuclear activities.”157 The 1994 Agreed Framework was 
signed in Geneva on 21 October 1994. The main provisions are as follows:  
• The United States would organize an international consortium to provide 
light-water reactors, with a total generating capacity of 2,000 megawatts, 
by a target date of 2003. In return, North Korea would freeze all activity 
on its existing nuclear reactors and related facilities, and permit them to be 
continuously monitored by IAEA inspectors. The eight thousand fuel rods 
unloaded from the first reactor would be shipped out of the country. 
• North Korea would come into full compliance with the IAEA―which 
meant accepting the “special inspections”―before the delivery of key 
nuclear components of the LWR project, estimated to be within five years. 
The DPRK’s existing nuclear facilities would be completely dismantled 
by the time the LWR project was completed, estimated in ten years. 
• The United States would arrange to supply 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil 
annually to make up for energy forgone by North Korea before the LWRs 
came into operation.   
• The two states would reduce existing barriers to trade and investment and 
open diplomatic liaison offices in each other’s capitals as initial steps 
toward eventual full normalization of relations. 158 
North Korea opted to take full advantage of the economic benefits from the 
agreement.  
C.   SUMMARY OF NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM   
In the final analysis, one clear North Korean nuclear strategy does not exist with 
absolute certainty. Any one of many internal and external motivations is plausible. The 
various motivations increase and decrease in importance, depending on how North Korea 
assesses the situation at a particular point. This changeability is a unique characteristic of 
North Korea’s nuclear strategy and is expected to continue. This shows why it is difficult 
to solve the North Korean nuclear problem and why unification is not easy to achieve.    
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A country’s nuclear motivation is important for defense-decision making and 
future unification. There could be some contradictions and differences between strategies. 
According to William E. Berry, Jr., “if regime survival is the predominant motivation, 
then there is little chance of meaningful negotiations. On the other hand, if the motivation 
is to create bargaining chips, it may be possible for negotiations to succeed. The divisions 
within the Bush administration make this determination more difficult.”159 It is difficult 
to analyze and predict the future of North Korea’s nuclear strategy and possibility of 
Korean unification because North Korea has multiple strategies and changes are 
dependent on circumstances. From North Korea’s perspective, the nuclear program is not 
only a matter of internal power maintenance but also a matter of regime survival from 
external threats and consistent with economic strategies to get more economic aid from 
outside.   
Based on North Korea’s multiple internal and external motivations, the 
circumstances will lead North Korea to rely more on one or another of the motivations 
discussed previously. The current circumstances related to North Korea’s nuclear issue 
are stalemated as well as complicated. Six party talks have not been easy. Depending on 
the U.S. policies, North Korea seems to be switching between its two strategies―regime 
survival and bargaining leverage. The reason is because it might be difficult for the 
Unites States to wage war both in Iraq and Korea.  
The Bush administration would like to persuade North Korea to give up its 
nuclear program at six-party talks instead of through any military action. Presumably, 
North Korea would have been more threatened by the short and successful end of the Iraq 
War. However, economic sanctions have not been lifted, in order to keep the pressure on 
North Korea. It might be a matter of power maintenance and regime survival to North 
Korea. At the same time, North Korea still needs economic help from outside because of 
its economic difficulties. The economic conditions remain very poor, but are better than 
in the 1990s. If the economic conditions continue to improve, a bargaining chip strategy 
might be not as necessary as that of the 1990s.   
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Therefore, it can be concluded that North Korea’s nuclear strategy is multifaceted, 
flexible and unpredictable. This reflects the fact that motivations for North Korea’s 
nuclear program have both internal and external roots. However, it is necessary to predict 
its complex motivation based on the current circumstances, because each motivation is 
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IV.  THE PROACTIVE GRAND STRATEGY FOR CONSENSUAL 
AND PEACEFUL KOREAN UNIFICATION: THE COMBINATION 
OF THREE POLICIES (MILITARY CONTAINMENT AND 
NEGOTIATIONS, POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT)  
Peaceful Korean unification is the best scenario for the two Koreas and for 
international society. The grand strategy recommended in this thesis is for consensual and 
peaceful Korean unification. Proactive implementation of the grand strategy can bring 
consensual and peaceful unification and prevent unstable situations like military conflict 
or the collapse of North Korea.  
A.  REASONS FOR CONSENSUAL AND PEACEFUL UNIFICATION 
1.  Peaceful Northeast Asia 
Northeast Asia (NEA) is one of the world’s most sensitive regions. The Korean 
peninsula is located in a very strategic place, which is the only international region where 
the world’s four major powers―the United States, China, Japan and Russia are directly 
interested. There were many wars among those great powers on the Korean peninsula. 
Several factors show that NEA is very important militarily and economically, as the 
home (or area of significant presence) of: “the world’s three largest nuclear weapons 
states (the United States. Russia, and China), one seminuclear state (North Korea), three 
threshold nuclear weapons states (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), the world’s three 
largest economies on a purchasing power parity basis (the U.S, China, and Japan), three 
of the world’s five largest trading countries (the United States, Germany, Japan, France, 
and China), and Asia’s three largest economies (Japan, China, and South Korea).”160   
A number of events in the last several years illustrate the simmering tensions in 
NEA, not just between North and South Korea, but among all the nations of the area. For 
example, Japan has historically claimed sovereignty over South Korea’s Dokdo islets 
(called Takeshima in Japanese). In 2005, South Korean demonstrators cut off their 
fingers in protest over this Japanese claims. Meanwhile, in June 2006 Ishibashi Mikio, 
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director general of the Guard and Rescue Department of the Japan Coast Guard, said in a 
parliamentary hearing, “If South Korea is found to be operating in Japan’s EEZ, we will 
take necessary measures to call for a halt to the activity by sending our patrol boats 
there.”161  While meeting with about 200 maritime police officers over lunch at Chong 
Wa Dae on 22 June 2006, South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun said that the nation 
should have enough military power to cope with any emergency situation in the East 
Sea.162 It is the first time that a president directly mentioned the nation’s combat potential.  
China and Japan have longstanding differences, as well. In April 2005, Chinese 
demonstrators attacked Japanese businesses over a Japanese history textbook’s 
interpretation of Japan’s military actions in China and Korea over the past century. In 
September 2005, China began drilling for oil in the East China Sea and Japan protested.  
The former Japanese Prime Minister, Koizumi, visited the Yasukuni Shrine (for Japanese 
soldiers who died fighting for the Emperor―many of them in China) and Chinese 
President Hu Jintao refused to have a meeting with Koizumi during the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation summit.  
None of these situations help the Korean peninsula become peaceful, and show 
that there are many issues to be resolved. South Koreans will try to increase their military 
capability not only to protect against North Korean attack but also to stand up to their 
other neighbors. 
Nuclear proliferation in NEA is a persistent problem. Proliferation on the Korean 
peninsula will have “a potentially devastating impact on peace and stability on the 
Korean peninsula and throughout the region.”163 For this reason, North Korean efforts to 
perfect delivery vehicle for its nuclear weapons provoke particular alarm among its 
neighbors. For example, according to U.S. officials in June 2006, North Korea had 
completed fueling the missile at the Musudan-ri facility in North Hamgyoung 
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province.164 Jung Tae-ho, a spokesman at the South Korean president’s office, told the 
Associated Press that “there are signs of a missile launch” and security officials were 
“closely watching the situation.”165 Though this was a test launch, and not actually aimed 
at another country, the instant concern it caused is emblematic of the state of hair-trigger 
tension that exists in the area. All the efforts of nations with keen interest in NEA – South 
Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia – to prevent nuclear proliferation in 
the region have failed.166 A peace treaty on the Korean peninsula is the first step to 
release all these tensions. 
2.  High Cost of War on the Korean Peninsula  
Military action might be the most direct way to unify Korea. Successful military 
operations will lead to the obliteration of the North Korean regime and Korean 
unification on the terms of South Korea and the United States. However, the cost of war 
on the Korean peninsula will be very high.  
Even though South Korea can win the war, the damage could be tremendous and 
restoration would be very difficult. The most vulnerable aspect of military operation is 
the location of Seoul, the capital of South Korea.  South Koreans who watched the news 
on 19 March 1994 were shocked by a “sea of fire” threat from North Korean 
representative, Park Yong-su. He threatened South Korean counterpart, Song Young Dae 
and walked out of the final South-North working level meeting at Panmunjom: “Seoul is 
not far from here. If a war breaks out, it will be a sea of fire. Mr. Song, it will probably be 
difficult for you to survive.”167 Seoul is only 25 miles away from the DMZ and the North 
Korean artillery and missile attack will devastate and panic Seoul. 168  WMD attack 
against Seoul would be horrible. Bruce Bennett, a policy analyst at Rand, predicted the 
tremendous threat of North Korea: 
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One battery of North Korean 240-mm multiple rocket launchers fired into 
Seoul can deliver roughly a ton of chemical weapons, which, according to 
various accounts, could kill or injure thousands or tens of thousands. 
North Korea has many such batteries. In addition, North Korean special 
forces teams might each spray several kilograms of anthrax in Seoul, 
leaving tens to hundreds of thousands of people infected, many of whom 
would die unless properly treated. 
A North Korean nuclear weapon fired into Seoul might cause damage 
similar to that of the nuclear weapon detonated on Hiroshima in World 
War II, which left some 70,000 dead and 75,000 injured.169 
During the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear program in the spring of 1994, 
General Luck estimated the possible result of a war on the Korean peninsula: 
…on the basis of the experience in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, that due 
to the colossal lethality of modern weapons in the urban environments of 
Korea, as many as 1 million people would be killed in the resumption of 
full-scale war on the peninsula, including 80,000 to 100,000 Americans, 
that the out-of-pocket costs to the United States would exceed $100 billion, 
and that the destruction of property and interruption of business activity 
would cost more that $1,000 billion (one trillion) dollars to the countries 
involved and their immediate neighbors.170 
David C. Kang introduced estimated calculations of a war on the Korean 
peninsula, which “would cost the United States more than $60 billion and result in 3 
million casualties, including 52,000 U.S. military casualties.”171  Any war on the Korean 
peninsula would be a disaster for the two Koreas and the United States.  
After a visit to Pyongyang in July 2003, a Russian specialist in East Asian studies 
predicted North Korea’s response to a preemptive strike would be prompt, “After 
studying this matter for a long time, the North Korean leadership reached the conclusion 
that since a limited attack could lead to an even more lethal attack, they must respond 
immediately with all their strength before their military strength becomes ineffective. The 
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target of their retaliatory attack could be Seoul.”172 Phillip C. Saunders explains three 
tactical issues that are important to consider before a military strike against North Korea:  
Three key issues would be involved in successful military strikes against 
North Korean nuclear facilities:  
1) locating all facilities and fissile material stocks that could be used in a 
nuclear weapons program; 
2) possessing the capability to destroy these targets; and 
3) preventing North Korea from retaliating with artillery fire, missile 
strikes, chemical or biological weapons use, escalation to a full-scale 
conventional war, or nuclear weapons173 
According to his analysis, the hardest problem is to prevent or limit North Korean 
retaliation.  
Also, Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow argue that “those who embrace 
optimistic scenarios regarding North Korean caution fail to explain why the North 
Korean elite would assume that a passive response to a U.S. preemptive strike would 
enhance prospects for regime survival. Given the way that United States treated Iraq, the 
North Koreans would more likely conclude that an attack on the country’s nuclear 
installations would be merely a prelude to a larger military offensive to achieve regime 
change.”174  
One of the problems of military action is the difficulty of getting support from 
South Korea. South Korea would not support any military action on the Korean peninsula. 
South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun has expressed that he would oppose a military 
attack on the North, “It is impossible not to have difference (with the United States), and 
I cannot agree to attacking North Korea.”175 The Clinton administration had unilaterally 
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prepared for military actions against North Korea in 1993.176 The South Korean President 
argued, “We almost went to the brink of war in 1993 with North Korea, and at the time 
we didn’t even know it.” South Korean Prime Minister Han Myung-sook said at an 
interpellation session in the National Assembly, “We must oppose Article 42 (of Chapter 
7) to be quoted in the resolution as it is very sensitive and may inflict damage (on the 
Korean Peninsula).”177 Article 42 of Chapter 7 in the U.N. Charter allows the use of 
military forces of U.N. members. South Korea has not joined PSI because of fear of 
provoking military escalation between the two Koreas.    
B. REASONS FOR THE COMBINATION OF THREE POLICIES (MILITARY 
CONTAINMENT AND NEGOTIATIONS, POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 
AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT)  
1. No Perfect Policy 
No policy option for Korean unification has ever succeeded because of North 
Korea’s position as a unification actor. North Korea has claimed that they are the 
legitimate government of the Korean people and reactions to the unification policies of 
South Korea have changed depending on domestic and international situations. Just like 
motivations for the nuclear program, North Korea has had multiple strategies and has 
switched among them for its own benefit. Therefore, unification policy toward North 
Korea should be comprehensive and multifaceted by combining three policies―military 
containment and negotiations, political negotiations, and economic and social 
engagement.  
Military containment will be fundamental to deter any military action of North 
Korea. However, containment alone will only bring on a more unstable situation on the 
Korean peninsula. At the same time, military negotiations should be initiated to release 
tensions. Pursuing political negotiations toward a peace treaty and deciding upon the type 
of government would not be successful in a short time and would need confidence 
building measures. Economic engagement alone will provide an initiative to North Korea 
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to start negotiations, but will not guarantee peaceful unification. Therefore, the 
combination of the three policies is necessary to achieve consensual and peaceful Korean 
unification.   
Proactive and synchronous implementation of the three policies is a pivotal point. 
“Military containment and negotiations,” “political negotiations,” and “economic 
engagement,” should be pursued together. Each policy is interdependent, but it can be 
implemented exclusively in order to deal with North Korea because each policy can be 
implemented in different fields. Militarily, strong defense is critical because it can 
support any other policy implementation. Without robust defense, political negotiation 
and economic engagement would be uncertain and insecure. Based on reliable defense, 
military negotiations for arms control may begin.   Politically, a peace treaty can be made 
because North Korea has requested a nonaggression declaration from the United States 
and the United States is not willing to use military action to achieve unification on the 
Korean peninsula. Economically, engagement policy should be maintained to open North 
Korea and provide humanitarian aid.  
2. Benefits for Peaceful Unification and after Unification 
South Korea and the four major powers prefer a peaceful unification option. 
Diplomatic recognition, a non-aggression treaty, and a peace treaty would be necessary 
steps for gradual and peaceful unification. Robust defense capability is necessary for 
stability after unification. South Korea’s reliable independent defense forces to lead 
stability and reconstruction operations are indispensable. Without political negotiations 
such as a peace treaty, peaceful unification is impractical. Also, economic engagement 
would be an investment for the economic development after unification. William Lewis, 
founding director of the McKinsey Global Institute thinks Korean unification would be a 
lot more difficult than German Unification:  
North Korea’s GDP per capita is only 5 percent of that of the South, yet its 
population is about half. The corresponding ratios for East Germany were 50 
percent of West Germany’s GDP per capita and only 25 percent of the 
population. The difficulties of German reunification look like a piece of cake 
next to the difficulties of Korean unification.178  
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It would be difficult to introduce the free market concept to North Koreans. 
Economic engagement will give them a chance to experience capitalism and a free 
market economy.  In order to implement political negotiations and economic engagement, 
military containment is important. The United States and South Korea should prop up 
political negotiation and economic engagement with strong military containment. The 
strong military support will decrease the possibility of any military action by North Korea. 
Also, it will help earn the people’s consensus and support for implementing political and 
economic policies. Also, a more self-dependant military capability of South Korean 
forces is necessary for stability in Northeast Asia after the Korean unification. 
3.  Three Inevitable Indicators of Peaceful Unification 
For peaceful Korean unification, the following indicators (from three 
perspectives) are inevitable. They are essential steps on the path of Korean unification. 
Potential indicators are outlined by Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee in Preparing 
for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications. Therefore, the efforts for unification 
in the following three fields are required.   
a. Military and Security Indicators 
Cessation of all hostile military activities would be the first step of 
consensual and peaceful unification. This can be achieved through confidence building 
measures. Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee summarized the indicators and 
several indicators are valid: 
• Cessation of diplomatic competition between the two Koreas and 
establishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and North 
Korea and Japan and North Korea. 
• Replacement of the Armistice Agreement (1953) with a permanent peace 
treaty. 
• Maintenance of all KEDO provisions and conditions. 
• Full North Korean compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and NPT provisions. 
• Significant progress in military CBMs, including prenotification of 
military exercises, establishment of a military hotline, mutual observation 
of military exercises and other command post exercises, and step-by-step, 
fully verifiable force reductions. 
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• Cessation of all military activities constructed as provocative or 
offensive.179  
b.  Political Indicators 
Political compromises and negotiations are required. A peace treaty can be 
signed not only from a military perspective but also a political perspective. There are also 
many other potential political indicators: 
• Mutual recognition across political institutions. 
• Cessation of all political propaganda by both sides. 
• Routinized high-level exchanges, including summit meetings. 
• Release of all political prisoners in the North and South. 
• Abrogation of national security and espionage laws (as they apply to the 
two Koreas). 
• Extensive exchange between political parties. 
• Ability to engage in political activities in the South and North.180  
c. Economic and Social Indicators 
Some of the economic and social indicators have already been seen on the 
Korean peninsula. These fields can be initiated at the beginning of a consensual and 
peaceful unification process and solidify Korean unification at the end. Potential 
economic and social indicators are as follows: 
• More freedom of movement and travel within and between the two Koreas, 
as well as abroad. 
• Cessation of government censorship. 
• Removal of restrictions on dissemination of print and electronic media. 
• Ability to enroll freely in schools and educational institutions. 
• Decoupling of economic exchange from reciprocal political measures. 
• Constitutional and legislative changes that allow for unconstrained 
economic activities between the South and North, including the flow of 
people, goods, services, capital and technologies.181  
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All indicators are not required for peaceful unification. However, it shows that 
military, political, and economic approaches are three fundamental factors in consensual 
and peaceful unification process. Pollack and Lee explain the difficulty of the peaceful 
unification scenario: 
The major distinguishing characteristic of the peaceful unification scenario 
compared to other scenarios is that agreement and compliance must be in 
place before, during, and after unification and that agreement must be 
reached at all levels of both systems in order to create a functioning, 
unified government. This last requirement is probably the most difficult 
part of the peaceful unification scenario.182 
Another difficulty of peaceful unification is the necessity of both domestic and 
international efforts for success. As discussed in the previous chapters, any changes on 
the Korean peninsula can be explained not only by internal roots but also by external 
roots. The international context should be considered in consensual and peaceful 
unification. Therefore, each policy can be divided into internal and external efforts. 
Those efforts are outlined in Table 2: The Grand Strategy for Consensual and Peaceful 
Unification: The Combination of Military, Political and Economic Approaches. 
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Table 2.   The Grand Strategy for Consensual and Peaceful Unification: the Combination of 
Military, Political, and Economic Approaches 
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V. UNIFICATION STRATEGY ONE: MILITARY CONTAINMENT 
AND NEGOTIATIONS 
The most important strategy for peaceful unification is to build a strong military 
against North Korea. National security is not a negotiable subject. As explained earlier, one 
of the internal roots of the Korean War was Kim Il-Sung’s misjudgment and North Korea 
still has an offense doctrine to unify Korea under its control. To deter any North Korean 
military attempts and implement the following two other strategies―political negotiations 
and economic engagement―strong defense capabilities are indispensable conditions. There 
are critiques that military containment and engagement policy cannot coexist. However, 
military containment provides the foundations for successful implementation of political 
negotiations and economic engagement. 
Even though Victor D. Cha is more skeptical about the prospects of North Korea 
and David C. Kang is less skeptical about them, they agree that engagement only works 
when robust military capability upholds the policy: 
First, and critical to any engagement policy, is the maintenance of robust 
defense and deterrence capabilities on the peninsula against the threat of a 
second DPRK invasion or other forms of military adventurism. Such 
capabilities would require maintaining even as the U.S.-ROK alliance 
undergoes imminent change. The United States contemplates a change in a 
nature of its military presence on the peninsula, moving from a heavy, 
ground troops-based tripwire presence to one focused on more recessed 
forces and a larger air and naval component. If North Korea views this 
readjustment of forces within the alliances as a diminishing of the U.S. 
commitment rather than as a natural maturation of the alliance given 
domestic politics in South Korea and changing military technology, then 
not only deterrence, but also engagement would be undercut. Engagement 
only works when it is undergirded by such capabilities and communicates 
to the target state that engagement is a choice of the strong and not an 
expediency of the weak183 
The improvement of military capability as well as strengthening military alliances is 
important to deter any military attempts by North Korea.  Robust defense capabilities remain 
the cornerstone of any efforts for unification and solutions toward North Korea’s nuclear 
program. Victor D. Cha explains the importance of “containment” in policy making: 
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The policy choice is therefore not between containment and some other 
policy, but now this military capability should be complemented 
diplomatically. In other words, should the policy be containment-plus-
diplomatic isolation (i.e., benign neglect); containment-plus-coercion; or 
containment-plus-engagement?184   
For successful deterrence, modernization of South Korean forces and maintenance 
of strong U.S.–ROK alliance system are necessary.    
A. INTERNAL EFFORTS  
South Korea should develop stronger forces to deter the North Korean threat on 
its own.  This gives a power to negotiate with North Korea militarily. Military-to-military 
negotiations are inevitable for peaceful Korean unification and a confidence-building 
process should be initiated.   
1. Modernization of South Korean forces  
South Korean forces should be modernized to deter a North Korean attack. North 
Korea has requested the withdrawal of the USFK from the Korean peninsula because 
they think the military capability of the U.S.-ROK alliance is superior to its own military. 
Modernization of South Korean forces will make North Korea reconsider the military 
capability of South Korean forces without USFK. Strong South Korean military forces 
will be a certain means of deterrence 
South Korea has declared its intention to pursue “cooperative self-reliant defense” in 
the 2004 Defense White Paper, 
In an effort to establish a firm security posture that serves peace and 
stability on the Korean peninsula, the Participatory Government seeks to 
establish a cooperative self-reliant defense wherein it endeavors to secure 
self-reliant defense capabilities and promote security cooperation among 
various nations. In other words, the government is endeavoring to develop 
capabilities and system by which it can take the initiative in deterring war 
provocations by the North, while promoting the ROK-US alliance from a 
future-oriented perspective and proactively taking advantage of 
multilateral security cooperation.185   
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Cooperative self-reliant defense comprises two important concepts: the South Korea–
U.S. alliance taking the leading role in deterring a North Korean attack and balanced 
development of a self-reliant defense posture.186 
The former Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld made a speech during his 
visit to Korea in 2003 about the role of the South Korean military. He understood South 
Korea’s position and perspective:   
The Republic of Korea is today probably the 12th largest growing 
domestic product on the face of the earth. It has a population that’s 
probably twice as large as North Korea’s. It has a vibrant, energetic 
economy. And as the President of Korea said within the last month or two, 
it is time for them to set a goal to become somewhat more self-reliant. 
They suggested they would do that over a decade’s period. And as they do 
that, which is I believe a sound approach from their standpoint, as they do 
that one would think we would be able to work with them to assure that 
the deterrent and the ability to defend remains effective. Because we do 
not want to inject any instability into this peninsula, this is an enormously 
important part of the world for us and for, needless to say, the people 
here.187   
South Korean military transformation should be carried out under the phased 
change of the USFK and South Korea should take a leading role in its own defense with 
the close cooperation and mutual understanding of the United States. 
In a couple of fields, the assistance of the United States is necessary. First, a huge 
investment of military resources in the modernization of the forces such as Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) and precision weapons is required. This modernization is necessary to deter the 
North Korean nuclear capability and achieve the South Korean military reform objectives, 
which are to make an “advanced, elite, and strong force of the 21st century” and “a state-
of-the art information-science based force that sees further, moves faster and strikes more 
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precisely.”188 The first chapter of Defense Reform 2020 states for “building up strong 
forces capable of defending Korea in the 21st century, we must start now.” 
Second, the most important capability that South Korea needs to prepare for self-
reliant defense is operations planning capability. The United States has war planning 
capability and experience.  The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea 
points out that the South Korean military does not have sufficient operational planning 
capability in Defense Reform 2020: 
3. Lack of cultivating our armed forces’ operational planning and 
execution capability under the ROK-US combined defense posture.  
The ROK-US alliance is moving forward to the future with more emphasis 
on the role of the ROK military in its national defense, recognizing that 
development of independent ROK strategy and military doctrines as well 
as operational capabilities are still insufficient. It is our urgent need to 
enhance our armed forces’ operational planning and execution capability. 
It is our urgent need to enhance our armed forces’ operational planning 
and execution capability.189  
Noh specifically explained the necessity of operational planning capability for South 
Korea, 
Since the Korean War, OPLAN has been designated by the Unites States – 
and, accordingly, the ROK – U.S. Combined Operation has been 
susceptible to America’s military strategy. South Korea’s efforts to 
coordinate its own strategy with the OPLAN have been obfuscated in 
many ways. There is thus a pressing need for South Korea to develop an 
operational plan to realize the independent use of military force.190    
South Korea will recover wartime operational control of its military from the 
United States. The modernization of South Korean forces by developing Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) and precision attack 
capability and war planning capability is necessary for successful transfer to wartime 
operational control as well as for successful deterrence of North Korean military action. 
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2.  Military-to-Military Negotiations 
It would be the most difficult problem to build a new unified military force 
because there is no trust between the two military forces. However, it is critical to 
combine forces during the unification process because the combined forces of South 
Korea and North Korea are large and could be a major obstacle to peaceful unification.191 
The way to handle the North Korean military will be the crucial problem and a strong 
South Korean military will make the negotiations process easier.  
Military-to-military negotiations between South Korea and North Korea have 
been very rare. In 2005, there was the first military negotiation after the Korean War. 
They agreed to open roads and railways, reduce maritime tension, and to stop DMZ 
propaganda.192 Any kind of military-to-military talks should help to reduce tensions on 
the Korean peninsula because the role of the military in North Korea is important in its 
policy making process. For example, Edward A. Olsen recommends that joint South 
Korean and North Korean armed forces units to participate in United Nations Peace 
Keeping Operations (PKO): 
Moreover, drawing on past ROK participation in United Nations Peace 
Keeping Operations (PKO), joint ROK-DPRK armed-forces units would 
likely serve in PKO roles for the United Nations as part of the inter-
Korean confidence-building process, it is very likely that a United Korea 
would continue to use some of its armed forces in that manner. Given the 
heritage of a United Korea’s PKO forces, they would present a particularly 
symbolic message on behalf of preserving peace.193   
The military structure of a unified Korea after a peaceful Korean unification 
process is a very complicated problem. The size and capability of military forces and the 
role and status of American forces are not easy problems to solve. According to Victor D. 
Cha, the military forces of a unified Korea would number about 650,000 because the total 
population of a unified Korea would be 65 million and the traditional benchmark of 
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military forces is approximately one percent of total population.194 The current total 
number of the two Korean militaries is around 1.8 million, which will be adjusted during 
a peaceful unification process.  
B. EXTERNAL EFFORTS 
1.  The U.S.-South Korea Alliance  
There have been concerns about the future U.S.-ROK alliance. The main concerns 
in South Korea relating to the U.S. military transformation are as follows: What will the 
impact of U.S. Defense Transformation on the Korean peninsula be? Is there a 
contradiction between U.S. Defense Transformation and the U.S-South Korea Mutual 
Defense Treaty? What should South Korea do to prepare to adapt to the new U.S. 
transformation?  All these concerns should be alleviated by showing that the U.S.-ROK 
alliance is a strong system. 
The main goal of the alliance should be to make North Korea believe that any 
military challenge against South Korea means the end of North Korea. The United States 
and South Korea should do more to clarify how much they have prepared for a potential 
war and develop their advantages in military capability against North Korea. More joint 
exercises and training are necessary to show the strong alliance system. However, these 
exercises should not be politically influenced. North Korea has continuously requested a 
stop to joint military exercises and has used them as an excuse to put off inter-Korean 
talks. Also, the Unification Ministry of South Korea reportedly asked the Defense 
Ministry in January 2006 if it could delay the annual joint military drills in order not to 
provoke North Korea at a time when the two Koreas would hold minister-level talks in 
Pyongyang.195 This request was rejected by the Defense Ministry. Joint military drills in 
the Korean peninsula are inevitable to deter any North Korean military action. Deterrence 
“tries to prevent attacks by threatening to respond in a way that would cause the other 
side to end up worse off, thereby convincing it not to launch an attack in the first 
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place.” 196  For example, joint exercises like RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward 
Movement and Integration) and FE (Foal Eagle) should provide strong deterrence.  
2.  Reciprocal Modification of Mutual Defense Treaties 
With maintenance of the strong U.S.-South Korean alliance, modification of 
mutual defense treaties is necessary for unification. All mutual defense treaties 
concerning the Korean peninsula show the influence of the great powers. They must be 
modified together. That is, even though the relationships between South Korea and 
Russia or China have been developed, the treaties between North Korea and Russia or 
China still exist. Two treaties―the DPRK’s Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance 
with China, and the North’s Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Russia―would 
be modified or abrogated when the U.S. and South Korea modify their Defense Treaty.   
a.  The U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty 
The United States negotiated a defense treaty with South Korea after the 
Korean War. Even though South Korean president Rhee did not sign the 1953 Armistice 
Agreement, he requested “the agreement which the United States used to mollify his 
dissatisfaction with the war’s indecisive outcome.”197 The United States increased its 
support by formally signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty on 1 October 1953 in 
Washington, which went into effect on 18 November 1954.198 Interestingly, as Bandow 
mentions, “the Mutual Defense Treaty does not explicitly guarantee U.S. military 
assistance to South Korea; rather, it states in Article 3 that each party would act to meet 
the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes,”  which later caused 
South Korea to request a strengthening of the clause.199 Therefore, the U.S. military 
presence in South Korea is flexibly based on the U.S. and South Korea Mutual Defense 
Treaty. 
b. The U.S. Military Presence in Korea 
Even though there are two distinguishable groups against troop 
withdrawal and for troop withdrawal―the goal of these two groups should be the same, 
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not for the exclusive interest of the great powers but for stability in Northeast Asia and 
for the Korean people. As mentioned earlier, the most important issue of the policies 
toward Korea is the U.S. presence in South Korea. Therefore, arguments against troop 
presence and for troop presence need to be considered. As a matter fact, the United States 
has begun to scale down its overseas troop levels. However, the U.S. military presence in 
Korea remains a vexing question.  
(1)  Argument against troop withdrawal. There are several 
reasons to support the U.S. presence in South Korea. One advantage is economic 
prosperity. Also, the U.S. military presence has contributed to political democratization 
of the ROK as well as to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. 
The growth of the South Korean economy has been spectacular. 
Between 1963 and 1983, the economy grew at a rate exceeding 9.5 percent annually, 
boosting per capita GNP from $100 in 1963 to over $1500 in 1983, as the government 
guided capital investment.200 South Korea was able to invest the capital for economic 
development rather than for its defense budget. 
Security is another main factor of the U.S presence in South Korea. 
Graves summarizes the ROK-U.S security cooperation very well: 
The alliance between the ROK and the United States has been one of the 
most successful examples of security cooperation in modern times. This is 
especially noteworthy given the great distance separating the two 
countries and the great differences in their heritage and ways of life when 
they first joined forces to defeat aggression from the North. The alliance 
has served both countries extremely well. It enabled the ROK to survive a 
potentially fatal war and grow into a modern industrial nation. And it 
enabled the United States to maintain a secure forward position in one of 
the strategic crossroads of the world.201         
It would be very difficult to pull troops out of South Korea unless the security concern is 
solved. 
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(2)  Argument for troop withdrawal. According to the U.S. plan 
for the realignment of its overseas forces, the U.S. forces in Korea will be reduced from 
32,500 to 25,000 by 2008.202 12,500 American troops deployed to Iraq from South Korea 
in 2005 may not come back to South Korea.203  In the Economist: The World in 2006, 
predicts the withdrawal of American troops, 
Over the next decade 60,000-70,000 American troops, almost a third of 
the total based overseas, will be withdrawn from their former cold-war 
stations, principally in Germany and South Korea, to America, where they 
may be more quickly-and more cheaply-launched against the country’s 
new security threats.204 
What would be the benefits of U.S. troop withdrawal? Dong 
Bandow explains three benefits of American disengagement for the United States:.  
One is simply reducing the likelihood of U.S. involvement in a war by 
dismantling a trip-wire designed to make military intervention 
automatic...Another advantage is economic. Although the precise 
budgetary savings would depend on what was done with the withdrawal..., 
the Pentagon would save several billion dollars…Finally, disengagement 
would have political benefits. Admittedly, without its 43,000 troops 
stationed in the ROK, Washington would not have as much leverage on 
particular political or economic issues…205  
The United States will withdraw its troops gradually. But, with 
little sign that North Korea is changing, the withdrawal would be very slow. Harrison 
proposed a guideline that is related to the U.S. policies on the Korean peninsula. It could 
be one option to be considered seriously by other scholars and decision makers: 
I conclude that the goal of the United States should be to disengage most 
of its forces from Korea gradually during a transition period of roughly ten 
years while seeking to encourage a confederation diplomatically by 
shifting to a new role as an honest broker. The eventual withdrawal of all 
U.S. forces would promote stability in Northeast Asia if it could be 
combined with a regional neutralization agreement in which China, Russia, 
the U.S. and Japan would all pledge to keep out of the peninsula militarily. 
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The United States would agree to end its security treaty with South Korea 
if China would terminate its treaty with Pyongyang and Russia would 
pledge not to restore its former treaty commitment. Pending such a 
neutralization agreement, the U.S. - South Korean security treaty would 
remain in force, and a limited, noncombat U.S. force presence would stay 
in the South to facilitate the reintroduction of U.S. combat forces in a 
crisis.206   
In sum, as scholars and policymakers weigh the pros and cons of 
the U.S. military presence in South Korea, some moderate and reasonable policy can be 
made because one main goal is to be achieved, which is stability and prosperity on the 
Korean Peninsula. Also, we should consider rising domestic demands―both from the 
ROK and the U.S.―for more comprehensive cooperation in regard to the future role of 
the U.S. forces in Korea should be taken into consideration. Olsen summarized the future 
U.S.-Korean relationship:  
…It is important for the broad spectrum of U.S. society and Koreans to 
explore well in advance―bilaterally and multilaterally―as many as 
possible of the ramifications that the future may hold. Nonetheless, it is a 
course of action that should be followed with enthusiasm and 
confidence―albeit belatedly.207  
c.  North Korea and China Treaty 
China has historically had influence on the Korean peninsula. Even though 
it is difficult to measure China’s influence on North Korea, it is clear that China is willing 
to be a main actor in the peace process. Also, if China helps North Korea economically 
and militarily, North Korea will remain in its present status and the possibility of Korean 
unification will be low.  David Kang analyzed China’s intention, 
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said that “Dialogue is vital to 
maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula and China is willing to 
work with all parties toward an early, peaceful solution to the issue.” 
Without Chinese support, sanctions or other hardline policies are unlikely 
to become effective. One key question is the extent of Chinese influence 
on North Korea.208  
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On the other hand, there is still a strong mutual defense treaty between 
North Korea and China. Harrison explained the treaty between North Korea and China, 
“while China has shifted to a more symmetrical posture in its dealing with the two 
Koreas, its new posture remains conspicuously asymmetrical in one critical aspect. 
Article 2 of the Sino-North Korean “Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty” 
declares that the two signatory nations guarantee to adopt immediately all necessary 
measures to oppose any country or coalition of countries that might attack either 
nation”209 This statement in the treaty very obviously shows the relationship between 
North Korea and China.   
However, there will be some change depending on the political situation. 
Pollack and Lee predict and explain China’s role:  
Though the Chinese have increased their energy and food aid in recent 
years, leaders in Beijing seem disinclined to undertake heroic measures on 
behalf of the North. But there appear to be three circumstances under 
which the Chinese might weigh such a course of action: (1) if the North 
(despite a clear aversion to dependence on China) signals its readiness to 
“tilt” toward Beijing in exchange for enhanced economic and political 
support; (2) if the indicators of instability in the North and its 
repercussions for stability and security in contiguous border areas 
convince the Chinese that they need to act to manage the risks to their 
security and ensure their long-term interests; or (3) if the ROK and the 
United States embark on unilateral actions to counter instability in the 
North that China believes would undermine its long-term political and 
security interests.210 
d.  North Korea and Russia Treaty  
The relationship between North Korea and Russia is different because 
there is no longer a Soviet Union. Even though there was a security treaty between North 
Korea and the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation said in 1996 that the clause was 
inoperative and a revised treaty was adopted in 1999.211 The revised treaty provided 
“only for consultation in the event of external threat to the security of either country.”212  
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The relationship between South Korea and Russia has changed since 1990 
and has influenced the relationship between North Korea and Russia. The Soviets 
requested economic aid from South Korea and wanted to open a diplomatic relationship 
with South Korea in September 1990.213 On 13-16 December 1990, a “Declaration of 
General Principles of Relations” was signed by South Korean President Roh Tae Woo 
and Gorbachev.214 The Declaration has a sentence concerning North Korea’s response, 
“the development of these links and contacts between South Korea and the USSR must 
not in any way affect their relationships with third countries or undermine obligations 
they assume under multilateral or bilateral treaties and agreements.”215 Perhaps, South 
Korea wanted to include the statement that because there are mutual treaties with the 
United States. Russia is also selling military equipment and technology to South Korea. 
Oberdorfer introduces an interesting episode to show the relationship between North 
Korea and the USSR. 
In a private meeting, Roh asked Gorbachev to “exert an appropriate influence” on 
North Korea to develop a more cooperative relationship. The Soviet leader said he 
was doing what he could―which wasn’t much, in view of Pyongyang’s angry 
reaction to his new friendship with Seoul.216  
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VI. UNIFICATION STRATEGY TWO: POLITICAL 
NEGOTIATIONS 
The Bush administration has been skeptical about negotiation with North Korea. 
On the other hand, North Korea wants bilateral talks with the United States. According to 
Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly, North Korea wants three things: “a 
nonaggression declaration from the United States, a peace treaty formally ending the 
Korean War, and Washington’s diplomatic recognition of the DPRK government.”217 
Kelly said, “North Koreans suggested that when all of these wonderful things were done, 
then we might be able to talk about their uranium enrichment program.” 218  The 
replacement of the Armistice Agreement by a peace treaty would be a first step to solve 
the animosity with North Korea.  
There have been many attempts to make a peaceful environment on the Korean 
peninsula since the Korean War. However, there has been no solution for a successful 
peace treaty. The reason can be found in the geopolitical characteristics of the Korean 
peninsula. Korea is surrounded and influenced by the great powers. Korea is located 
among four great powers and remains divided due to their influence. Therefore, a 
successful peace treaty can not only be made by the two Koreas but also the great powers. 
The United States cannot sign a peace treaty by itself. A peace treaty must go through a 
step-by-step process. First, the United States should help South Korea and North Korea 
initiate steps to make a peace treaty. There are three agreements between South Korea 
and North Korea that can help prepare a peace treaty. Second, four-party talks, including 
the United States and China, can replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. 
Third, the U.N. Security Council should make a resolution to support a peace treaty. The 
U.N. General Assembly will endorse a peace treaty that would lead to a peaceful 
Northeast Asia as well as a peaceful world. The United States can help encourage the UN 
to endorse a peace treaty with strong support from all over the world.   
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A.  INTERNAL EFFORTS  
1.  Political Stability through Another Summit Meeting 
North Korea should not repeat its misjudgment. The lack of foresight of the North 
Korean leader led to the Korean War and resulted in the death of 3,000,000 people and 
the permanent division of Korea. Before the Korean War, the lack of political consensus 
and compromise was a general characteristic of Korean politics. Without political 
stability, it is impossible to prevent war. It is extremely difficult to convert different 
ideologies without force.  However, step-by-step agreements are necessary for consensual 
and peaceful unification.  
A Kim Jong-Il visit to Seoul will help stabilize the political situation on the 
Korean peninsula. One of the agreements at the 2000 South Korea and North Korea 
summit meeting was a Kim Jong-Il visit to Seoul: 
5. The South and North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant 
authorities in the near future to implement the above agreement 
expeditiously. 
President Kim Dae Jung cordially invited National Defense Commission 
chairman Kim Jong Il to visit Seoul, and Chairman Kim Jong Il decided to 
visit Seoul at an appropriate time.219   
2. Peace Treaty between South Korea and North Korea by Reaffirmation 
of Three Agreements (The July 4 Joint Statement, The Base Agreement 
on 12 December 1991, and a Joint Declaration on 15 June 2000)    
South Korea and North Korea should reaffirm three agreements―the July 4 Joint 
Statement, the Basic Agreement on 12 December 1991, and The Joint Declaration on 15 
June 2000. The common thread of those three agreements is that South Korea and North 
Korea want to achieve peace on the Korean peninsula through an independent and 
peaceful process.   
For example, the first two principles of the July 4 Joint Statement declared the 
independent unification goal and peaceful relationship between the two Koreas “First, 
unification shall be achieved through independent efforts without being subject to 
external imposition or interference. Second, unification shall be achieved through 
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peaceful means, and not through use of force against one another.”220 The 1991 the Basic 
Agreement reconfirmed the July 4 Joint statement in Preamble and Chapter One.221 In 
the Joint Declaration on 15 June 2000, the first article mentions the two Korea’s status in 
the reunification process, “The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question 
of reunification on their own initiative and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, 
who are the masters of the country.”222  South Korea and North Korea already have a 
basic agreement that can be the cornerstone of a peace treaty. It is important to figure out 
how to implement those agreements with trust.  
Without the agreement of the two Koreas, which are the main parties to a peaceful 
unification, conclusion of a peace treaty is an unattainable goal on the Korean peninsula. 
On 13 June 2006, 16 South Korean Assembly members and 231 people from 92 NGO 
groups turned in a written petition to the Assembly to request ratification of the 1992 
Basic agreement.223 Even though the 1992 Basic Agreement was adopted and initiated on 
13 December 1991, it was not ratified by the Assembly. After the Basic Agreement was 
signed by the Prime Ministers of both Koreas in 1991, it was not discussed by the 
Assembly.  
Jeong Se-Hyun, vice president of the Research Institute for National Unification 
in 1992 and later the Minister of Unification during the Roh Administration, mentions the 
importance of the legal status of the Basic Agreement, “In order for the Basic Agreement 
to be fulfilled and practiced with national consensus and support, its legal status and the 
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presidential ratification requires the National Assembly’s agreement has become the 
subject of debate in South Korea.”224 It is necessary to forge a national consensus at the 
beginning of a peace treaty process.     
That is, the National Assembly should be one of the main actors of 
implementation. The President and the Ministry of Unification should also review all of 
the former agreements and start negotiations with North Korea to reaffirm an agreement.  
B.  EXTERNAL EFFORTS  
The international political situation on the Korean peninsula has changed since 
the end of the Cold War. The roles of the United States and China have been important. 
The United States has been unwilling to discuss a peace treaty with North Korea and 
called North Korea a terrorist nation. The policy of the United States has heavily 
influenced the stability of the Korean peninsula. It is impossible to have a peace treaty 
without U.S. involvement. Also, China as one of the signatories of the Armistice 
Agreement needs to be involved in the discussion to replace the Armistice Agreement 
with a peace treaty.  
Finally, the endorsement and support of the U.N. is important because the United 
States led the U.N. forces and fifteen other countries who fought during the Korean War. 
Also, Russia and Japan, which have interests on the Korean peninsula, can be included 
during the endorsement process. The establishment of a peace treaty through international 
support will bring peace and prosperity to the Korean peninsula as well as to Northeast 
Asia. It will be a first symbolic step to move forward to a more peaceful world in the 
twenty-first century.  
1.  Four-Party Talks  
The United States has not discussed a peace treaty with North Korea. On the other 
hand, South Korea concluded an “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, 
Exchange and Cooperation” with North Korea on 19 February 1992.225 The United States 
should encourage the two Koreas to initiate a peace treaty process. The White House and 
the Department of State can help South Korea prepare a peace treaty. They should 
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discuss this matter with China and ask for four-party talks to replace the Armistice 
Agreement with a peace treaty. The members of the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate can 
give South Korea advice and prepare for ratification.    
There are two defense treaties―“the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty” and “the 
North Korea’s Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance with China”―related to a peace 
treaty on the Korean peninsula. The United States and China need to participate in the 
negotiations to revise these treaties for the successful establishment of a peace treaty. 
North Korea always argues that the withdrawal of the USFK should be the primary issue of 
any talks related to a peace treaty. The U.S. military presence in Korea is such a hot topic for 
a peace treaty that the four parties should be involved in a peace treaty process. Furthermore, 
even though there are two distinguishable groups – against troop withdrawal and for troop 
withdrawal―the goal of these two groups should be the same, not for the exclusive interest 
of the great powers but for stability in Northeast Asia and for the Korean people. As 
mentioned earlier, the most important issue of the policies toward Korea is the U.S. presence 
in South Korea. Therefore, arguments against troop presence and for troop presence on the 
Korean peninsula need to be considered during the peaceful unification process. As a matter 
fact, the United States has already begun its withdrawal. However, the U.S. military presence 
in Korea remain a vexing question.   
2.  Endorsement of the UN 
The United Nations played a significant role in the Korean War. Fortunately, the 
Soviet Union had boycotted the Security Council meeting in 1950 because they insisted 
that the People’s Republic of China was the appropriate entity to be a member of the 
Council rather than the Republic of China.226 The Korean War was the first international 
conflict in which the U.N. intervened.227 Fifteen countries joined forces with the United 
States and South Korea to fight against the North Korean invasion under the United 
Nations Command in Korea.228  “Although the U.S. military dominated the coalition 
effort, thousands of other soldiers fought under the U.N. flag, including troops from 
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Ethiopia, Columbia, and Luxumbourg. A total of 150,000 foreign servicemen fought in 
the Korean War, with over 11,000 wounded and 5,000 either killed or listed as missing in 
action”.229  
However, the United Nations has not played an active role in Korea since the 
Korean War. In order to achieve the U.N.’s objective to protect South Korea from the 
communist threat and end the Korean War honorably, the U.N. should make an effort to 
accelerate the peace talks on the Korean peninsula. The influence of the U.N. in Korea 
has been weakening. For example, the U.N. command in Korea has never reported to the 
U.N. secretary general.230 One of the reasons why the U.N. cannot play an active role in 
Korea is that “the United States has the right to act on behalf of the United Nations.”231 
When North Korea asked U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to initiate steps 
for the termination of the U.N. command, the response of Boutros Boutros-Ghali to North 
Korea explained the status of the U.N. command in fact. Harrison quotes how he 
responded, 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali replied categorically on June 24 that the United 
States alone has the authority to “decide on the continued existence or the 
dissolution of the United Nations Command.” He recalled that Security 
Council Resolution 84 of 7 July 1950, “limited itself to recommending 
that all Members providing military forces and other assistance to the 
Republic of Korea ‘make such forces and other assistance available to a 
unified command under the United States of America.’232     
Even though the U.N. command in Korea is under U.S. control, it is important 
that the U.N. play a role in improving peace in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, the 
endorsement of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) is necessary because the Armistice 
Agreement was signed by the U.N. and a peace treaty is the official end to the Armistice 
Agreement. The peace treaty on the Korean peninsula may need to follow the treaty 
process–“negotiation, signature, ratification, reservation, entry into force and 
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registration.”233 However, a solution to the legal problem over how to finally end the 
Korean War will clearly require a more flexible formula.234 That is, the two Koreas can 
initiate the negotiations. The United States and China would like to join the negotiations. 
Also, several unique conditions on the Korean peninsula, such as the signatories, the 
status of the Armistice Agreement, and a treaty between South Korea and North Korea 
should be considered in the legal process.  In the end, endorsement of the UNSC would 
constitute the definitive end of the Korean War.235 The endorsement of the U.N. would 
honor the United Nations’ efforts and contributions.  
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VII. UNIFICATION STRATEGY THREE: ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT 
The economic gap between the two Koreas is dramatic. Economic data such as 
the volume of trade, real per capita incomes and growth rates are much higher in South 
Korea.236 North Korea’s economy is almost a total failure. Economic engagement is 
necessary to influence North Korean society. Also, it will prevent North Korea from 
collapsing suddenly. Radical change such as North Korean collapse will lead to serious 
instability on the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, by blocking economic aid to North 
Korea, the harsh state of the economy will make North Korean people more belligerent 
and anti-American. Economic aid will be continuously requested by North Korea, 
making economic incentives an effective way to engage that country. According to 
Marcus Noland, there are three scenarios in terms of economics: 
…in the first, the North Koreans see the error of their ways, and undertake 
fundamental economic reform. Although this would be highly desirable, it is 
also highly unlikely…At the other extreme, the state could simply collapse 
and be absorbed by South Korea, much like East Germany was absorbed by 
West Germany. Although this would arguably be an improvement from the 
status quo, this, too, is not particularly likely…The third, and most likely, 
alternative, is that North Korea continues to muddle along, making ad hoc 
policy changes as circumstances dictate, and relying on its neighbors for 
support…In the case of North Korea, whether the regime is willing and able 
to make the necessary changes to ensure its own survival is still uncertain.237 
A. INTERNAL EFFORTS 
Despite the obvious economic difference, economic cooperation between the two 
Koreas would be the driving force for successful peaceful unification. The motive power 
can be found in common characteristic such as hard work and teamwork tradition, respect 
for education, and nationalism. J. Barkly Rosser, Jr. and Marina V. Rosser predict the 
optimistic outcome of economic engagement between the two Koreas: 
Despite these contrasts, the two Koreas have much in common 
economically, a fact that may yet be important if they unify. They share a 
strong Confucian tradition and the competitive spirit of Hahn, the latter 
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stimulated by the decades-long competition between them as well as their 
shared resentment of Japan. They possess the two hardest-working labor 
forces in the world, as measured by the average length of the work week. 
They also share a respect for education that has led to nearly universal 
literacy, as well as very rapid growth rates of high-tech education among 
their populations.238 
1. Expansion of Economic Engagement  
The Gaesung Industrial Complex is located one hour’s distance from Seoul. The 
Gaesung Industrial Complex Development Project which combined South Korean capital 
and North Korean labor will help businesses reestablish their competitiveness, as well as 
serve “as a testing ground for inter-Korean economic cooperation.”239 An official at the 
Unification Ministry of South Korea said that “The Kaesung complex is expected to 
churn out products worth a record high of $6 million this month, despite security 
concerns on the Korean peninsula caused by the North’s missile launches on 5 July.”240 
South Korea and North Korea should develop more economic relations because trade has 
been a major route for opening relations and will reduce the tensions by changing the 
self-reliant and closed economic system to an open and dependent economy. Economic 
relations would be one of the main factors in a peace treaty process. The ROK Ministry 
of Unification and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the two Koreas should help increase 
trade between South Korea and North Korea.  
2. Sports/Tourism Interchanges  
The two Koreas will send one team to the 2008 Beijing Olympics in China.241 
South Korea will support athletes from North Korea and vice versa. The preparation 
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period will give more opportunities to communicate and build confidence. This unrelated 
event will make the peace treaty negotiation process easier. 
In 2005, there were 88,341 people who traveled between South Korea and North 
Korea. That number is almost as big as the total of 85,400 people traveling during the 60 
years since the end of the Korean War. This major change is because of tours to Mt. 
Geumgang and the Gaesung Industrial Complex. From November 1998 when the tours to 
Mt. Geumgang first began, until June 2005, a total of 1,000,000 people have participated 
in these tours.242  
In 2006, in spite of unstable conditions from the missile launch and nuclear test 
on the Korean peninsula, the number of inter-Korean exchanges of people increased 15.1 
percent from that of last year and reached 101,708 in addition to the tourists to Mt. 
Geumgang.243  Also, those who visited North Korea by road exceeded one million.244 
The Ministry of Unification of South Korea said that “The South Korean government will 
continuously devise measures such as opening of railroads and improving the overland 
transit system so that the inter-Korean cooperation and exchange become more 
active.”245 As the Ministry of Unification expresses, this interchange should be continued. 
The Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of South Korea 
should play a leading role in this process.  
3. Economic Cooperation in the Industrial Complex 
The Gaesung Industrial Complex is located one hour’s distance from Seoul. The 
Gaesung Industrial Complex Development Project combines South Korean capital with 
North Korean labor and will help businesses reestablish their competitiveness, as well as 
serving “as a testing ground for inter-Korean economic cooperation.”246 The two Koreas 
have agreed to build the 16,337 acre complex and an accompanying city through in three 
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stages plan by 2012.247 The first stage was planned to develop 817 acres by the end of 
2007 and more than 70 percent of the planned site has been completed by January 
2006.248 According to the Ministry of Unification of South Korea, the number of North 
Korean workers in the Gaesung Industrial Complex exceeded 10,000 on 21 November 
2006 and reached 11,189 as of 31 December 2006.249 The second and third stages of the 
project will be completed in 2012 and the South Korean government expects that a total 
of 350,000 workers will be employed and some $15 billion worth products will be 
produced in the Gaesung Industrial Complex by 2012.250 
These Gaesung Industrial Complex projects and agreements between South Korea 
and North Korea show that the two Koreas are willing to cooperate economically and that 
their plans are progressing. The Gaesung Industrial Complex provides a model of 
economic cooperation after unification, which is the combination of South Korea’s 
finance and technologies and North Korea’s land and labor. The success of Gaesung 
Industrial Complex will show the possible economic integration of the two Koreas. The 
two Koreas should implement all agreements without regard to political influence. Also, 
the incomes of the two Koreas should be transparently used not for the military purpose 
but for the economic and social purpose. After North Korea’s nuclear test, the Gaesung 
Industrial Complex project has been a subject of debate in South Korea and the United 
States. It is important to clarify that the Gaesung Industrial Complex is not for North 
Korea’s military preparation but for economic integration between the two Koreas. 
B. EXTERNAL EFFORTS 
Compared to the costs of German unification, the costs of Korean unification are 
expected to be more than $2 trillion.251 It is impossible for South Korea alone to provide 
this money.   
                                                 
247 Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States of America, “The Gaesung Industrial 
Complex: Engine for Northeast Asia’s Industrial Development,” 5, 
http://www.koreaembassy.org/han_links/multimedia/gaesung_web.pdf (accessed on 6 January 2007). 
248 Ibid.  
249 The Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, “The Number of Inter-Korean Exchange of 
People Exceeded 100,000 in 2006.”   
250 Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States of America, “The Gaesung Industrial 
Complex: Engine for Northeast Asia’s Industrial Development,” 5. 
251 Olsen, Korea: The Divided Nation, 163.  
87 
1.  Economic Incentives and Trade  
North Korea has experienced serious economic decline since the end of the Cold 
War and recorded negative gross domestic product (GDP) for most of 1990s.252 Far from 
providing economic development, North Korea can hardly keep its people alive. The 
1994 Agreed Framework was one example that economic incentives like energy worked 
to a certain degree in developing peaceful environments. Marcus Noland says, “The 
North Korean economy desperately needs two things to meet the minimum survival 
requirements of its population: food and energy.”253    
Because of the desperate need of energy and food for survival, economic aid 
would be a good incentive to make North Korea move toward the negotiating table. 
Many hydroelectric plants and thermal power plants are not operating efficiently or to 
capacity in North Korea. Bradley O. Babson said that “There is no question that the 
highest priority sector for economic engagement with the DPRK will be energy, both 
because it is essential for economic recovery and because it is linked to the security 
guarantees and economic assistance commitments that will be integral to any agreement 
that results in the dismantling of the DPRK’s nuclear program.”254 
According to Marcus Noland, the 1994 Agreed Framework was not efficient and 
repair of existing plants is a better alternative: 
The 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States 
provides for the construction of two light water reactors and the provision 
of oil in the interim. The problem is that this is essentially a diplomatic 
agreement over North Korea's nuclear program, and does not really 
address the true needs of the North Korean economy. From an economics 
standpoint, it would be better to renegotiate the Agreed Framework, 
scrapping the costly light water reactors, and instead building more cost-
effective electrical generating systems, refurbishing the existing electrical 
grid, and building the necessary infrastructure that would allow North 
Korea to export electricity to South Korea and China, and thereby earn 
foreign exchange.255   
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Also, the conference report published by the Stanley Foundation recommends an 
energy conservation program and renovation of existing power plants: 
…the DPRK also is not maximizing the energy resources available to it. 
Energy efficiency is extremely poor due to bad management and 
deteriorated infrastructure, so conservation is an immediate 
imperative...Current political and economic realities make it unlikely that 
the development of light water nuclear power will continue. But other 
projects may be more pressing in the near future. The restoration and 
repair of existing power plants and the upgrading of the transmission and 
distribution infrastructure are required to operate the system already 
existing or to make practical use of energy provided from outside 
sources.256  
Another approach would be trade with North Korea. David Kang argues that 
North Korea wants to trade with other countries: 
The collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2002 was disappointing because 
North Korea, unlike Iraq, has been actively seeking accommodation with the 
international community in a number of areas. We should encourage this 
trend, not hinder it. It makes no sense to criticize North Korea for being 
isolationist and then refuse to trade with them.257 
Whether it is economic aid or trade, economic engagement is an important factor 
to open North Korea and prepare for a healthy economy of a unified Korea. 
2. Supporting Economic Cooperation between South Korea and North 
Korea 
The United States, China and Japan can help inter-Korean economic cooperation.  
a.  The United States 
The United States has not been proactive about the South Korean 
economic engagement policy toward to North Korea. The different perspectives on 
economic engagement policy between South Korea and the United States have been a 
problem in the economic cooperation between the two Koreas. Four U.S. Congressmen 
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visited the Gaesung Industrial Complex on 1 December 2006.258 This was the first visit 
of U.S. Congressman to the Gaesung Industrial Complex. It is important for the United 
States to understand the economic cooperation between South Korea and North Korea.  
During the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) meeting in 2006 between South 
Korea and the United States, both governments have expressed their different 
perspectives about the GIC. Products made in the GIC have been the big issue. The South 
Korean government has claimed that products made in the GIC should be treated as 
Korean-made products in the FTA. The report of Institute for International Economics 
(IIE), entitled “Negotiating the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement” said that “the 
United States has never entered into an FTA with a country that is the target of US 
economic sanctions.”259 South Korea and The United States should try to bridge a gap in 
the attitude toward the economic cooperation with North Korea.   
b. China  
North Korea attempted to build the Sinuiju Free trade zone (FTZ) on the 
northeastern border with China in 2000. However, the development plan of the Sinuiju 
FTZ has been stopped since China arrested Yang Bin who was assigned as the head of 
the development project for tax dodging.260  China can teach its know-how about the 
development of an economic zone or help South Korean business people use its border to 
access and develop the Sinuiju area. Without China’s official assistance, the Sinuiju FTZ 
development project can not start again. 
Lee Dong Wook, a Korean China analyst said that the failure of Sinuiju 
was due to the stupidity of North Korean leaders and the lack of China’s help: 
They should have not believed that big talk of the Chinese northerner. 
Although overgeneralization is always dangerous, my experience tells me 
something about people from that region. Many of them love to say that 
they are “defang” (big-minded). Thanks to their defang spirit and valor, 
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many northerners succeed in becoming military brass…Yang went abroad 
in an area where even real professionals are reluctant to comment…North 
Korean leaders should have considered international eco-politics with their 
neighbors before they announced such an ambitious plan. China did not 
welcome the idea of developing Sinuiju at the expense of other 
neighboring cities in its northern provinces.261    
Sinuiju is located at the North Korea and China northwest border. It faces 
the city of Dandong, Liaoning province in China across the Yalu River. This area became 
known after the Ryongchun train explosion in April 2004.262 Sinuiju is advantageously 
for economic cooperation with China. The Sinuiju Railway can connect Europe and Asia. 
It can start from Japan and connect with Seoul, Pyongyang, Beijing, Ulaanbaatar, 
Moscow, Istanbul, Paris, and other European cities. The flow of people, goods, capital 
and culture by train will bring tremendous change.    
c.  Japan 
After the North Korean missile launch and nuclear test in 2006, Japan has 
imposed sanctions and led the United States Security Council to issue a resolution against 
North Korea.263 Japan is believed to have dropped from North Korea’s second largest 
trading partner to its fifth largest partner (behind China, South Korea, Thailand, and 
Russia) after imposing Japan’s sanctions.264 Economic sanctions and decrease of trade 
have not solved the North Korean nuclear problem, but they do send a direct message to 
North Korea that its nuclear weapons program is the primary concern of Japan.  
However, its success depends on support from other countries, especially 
China. It takes a long time and great efforts to implement sanctions successfully. China 
has hesitated imposing sanctions that would lead to a collapse of North Korea because it 
would send millions of refugees across the border.265  According to a congressional 
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report, China refused to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and raised 
questions about whether it will cooperate in a United Nations embargo.266  
Also, South Korea has expressed dissent about the unilateral sanctions of 
Japan because there are differences in South Korea’s engagement policy. During the 
APEC meeting in November 2006 after North Korea’s nuclear test, the leaders of South 
Korea, the United States and Japan agreed to use sanctions and dialogue in parallel to 
lead North Korea into dismantling its nuclear program. 267  However, there was no 
coordination in economic policy between South Korean and Japan.  Therefore, unilateral 
economic sanctions toward North Korea would not be successful without cooperation 
with South Korea and China. Coordination is vital. Japanese assistance toward a unified 
Korea during the unification process will influence the economic relationship between 
Japan and a unified Korea.  
In order to achieve peaceful unification under South Korea’s lead, Japan’s 
economic policy toward North Korea needs to adjust to South Korea and China as well as 
the United States. Any unilateral economic policy like economic sanctions would not be 
effective and will not be beneficial for Japan with a unified Korea in the long term. Japan 
needs to consider introducing a market economy and promoting trade with North Korea. 
It will not only reduce North Korea’s threat but also contribute to the close relationship 
with a unified Korea in the future.      
3. Multilateral Economic Approach with North Korea  
South Korea cannot provide all the economic needs for North Korea during the 
unification process. Through the peaceful unification process, the optimum economic 
unification scenario is North Korea’s change in economic system. Gradual integration 
into the international economic system and transition to a free market economic system 
are ideal in a unified Korea.  Collective efforts by international organizations in economic 
restructuring and development in North Korea area are critical. International 
organizations can provide “objectivity, neutrality, experience, and mobilization of 
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financial resources to support the transition to a market economy that is integrated in the 
regional and international economic system.” 268 
The United States, Japan and South Korea can encourage multilateral 
organizations to facilitate economic cooperation and consultations with North Korea. For 
example, multilateral organizations such as the UN, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) can provide a mechanism for 
providing more information and knowledge about North Korean administrative structures 
and procedures.269  These organizations can request more transparent information by 
providing capital for economic development. The assistance of the United States and 
Japan is necessary for implementation in these organizations because they play main 
roles. 
Even though North Korea has expressed interest in joining the multilateral 
organizations, no progress has been made. Marcus Noland said, “Membership talks have 
never made much progress, for they have snagged on economic data and information 
required for membership in these organizations and Japanese opposition relating to 
unresolved political issues, most notably the alleged kidnapping of Japanese citizens.”270 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Two major ideas are discussed in this thesis. First, Korean unification is only 
possible with internal and external efforts working together. Second, internal and external 
efforts in military, political, and economic areas should be implemented in proactive and 
comprehensive ways. The two Koreas and four powers―China, Japan, Russia and the 
United States―need to be more proactive in working toward Korean unification and 
should introduce policy measures aimed at shaping more favorable domestic and 
international environments for consensual and peaceful unification. According to Edward 
A. Olsen, the influence of neighboring countries on the Korean peninsula is not favorable 
for Korean unification: 
For better or worse, the superpower backers of both Koreas during the 
Cold War readily adjusted to dealing with Korean issues in the context of 
the divided nation being part of the geopolitical status quo that was best 
coped with by seeking to preserve its stability. In other words, neither the 
U.S. nor the USSR had much reason to be proactive with respect to 
bringing the two Koreas back together as one nation state. As time passed, 
both Koreas developed conflicting interests that reinforced their division 
and confirmed the conventional strategic thinking in Washington and 
Moscow. The two Koreas’ Chinese and Japanese neighbors exacerbated 
this situation by cultivating international politics throughout the Cold War 
that gave them reason to value the stability of the Korean status quo.271 
These kinds of approaches and attitudes based in Cold War thinking should be 
changed. All positive aspects of and proactive support for Korean unification should be 
considered. 
For the policy implementation for Korean unification, military containment and 
negotiation cannot be emphasized enough as the fundamental condition for successful 
security. Military backing for implementation of political and economic policies is 
required. A strong military will weaken North Korea’s ability to employ threats and bring 
North Korea to the negotiating table. Political negotiations over a peace treaty should be 
included in domestic and international efforts. Finally, economic and social engagement 
efforts are also necessary to provide support for successful unification and stability after 
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unification. Through the proactive implementation of Korean unification by the two 
Koreas and four powers, the world will be more stable and peaceful. Korean unification 
is not only unification of the two Koreas but also integration of the great powers for 
peace and prosperity in international politics. Peaceful Korean unification will be a first 
symbolic step on the road to a more peaceful world in the twenty first century. 
The 1943 Cairo conference by the United States, China, and Great Britain 
promised an independent Korea “in due course.”272 The great powers did not expect 
Korea’s long division and intended to “help foster the reemergence of a single, 
independent, sovereign Korean nation-state.”273 The impact of the Cold War was to 
consolidate the separation of the two Koreas. It is time to think about a “free and 
independent one Korea in due course.” South Korea has shown the capability to be a free 
and independent state since the Korean War. South Korea has bested North Korea in 
political, economic, and diplomatic competition since the Korean War. The last five 
decades form the history of competition in the Cold War context. The next century 
should be the history of coexistence in the international context after the Cold War. South 
Korea as a winner should lead the peaceful Korean unification process by recognizing 
North Korea as a counterpart and introducing the ways of an economic and diplomatic 
success story. The support of neighboring countries will foster the consensual and 
peaceful unification process. 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Korea was a place of conflict among the 
great powers. Korea lost its sovereignty and was divided into two countries. The end of 
the Cold War has changed the balance of power against North Korea. Changes in the 
international situation such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic development of 
China, and South Korea’s normalization of relations with China and the Soviet Union in 
the early 1990s explain why North Korea has persisted in seeking to develop a self-reliant 
nuclear deterrent without help from its two Cold War patrons―China and Russia. More 
hostile policies toward North Korea will only make the situation worse.  
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In the twenty-first century, if Korea unifies peacefully through domestic and 
international efforts, North Korea’s nuclear standoff can be solved. Furthermore, Korea 
will be a “peace bridge” to connect the United States, Japan, China, and all other 
countries in Asia and Europe economically, politically and strategically. This will lead to 
the most prosperous period in history. Consequently, consensual and peaceful Korean 
unification through the proactive implementation of military, economic and political 
policies by the two Koreas and international community is essential for world peace. The 
rivalries of the two Koreas and their neighbors will not lead to peace and prosperity―for 
the Korean peninsula or the world. Therefore, the two Koreas and four powers should 
consider adopting a more proactive policy for peaceful Korean unification. 
Finally, consensual and peaceful Korean unification is not an easy goal to achieve. 
However, without Korean unification, peace and security throughout the region remain a 
remote goal. Success in peaceful Korean unification will have the tremendous benefit of 
laying the foundations for peace and security in northeast Asia and around the world. 
Korean unification means the eventual complete end of the Cold War and the start of a 
new peaceful era in history. Therefore, more proactive policy implementation should be 
considered. There is a most famous song in Korea, “Uriui Sowoneun Tong-Il” (Our 
heartfelt wish is unification). The Korean dream of peaceful unification will come true 
and be beneficial when unification becomes the heartfelt wish not only of the two Koreas, 
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